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ABSTRACT. The prime purpose of this paper is, first, to restore to discourse-bound
occasion sentences their rightful central place in semantics and secondly, taking these as
the basic propositional elements in the logical analysis of language, to contribute to the
development of an adequate logic of occasion sentences and a mathematical (Boolean)
foundation for such a logic, thus preparing the ground for more adequate semantic, logical
and mathematical foundations of the study of natural language. Some of the insights elab-
orated in this paper have appeared in the literature over the past thirty years, and a number
of new developments have resulted from them. The present paper aims at providing an
integrated conceptual basis for this new development in semantics. In Section 1 it is argued
that the reduction by translation of occasion sentences to eternal sentences, as proposed by
Russell and Quine, is semantically and thus logically inadequate. Natural language is a
system of occasion sentences, eternal sentences being merely boundary cases. The logic
has fewer tasks than is standardly assumed, as it excludes semantic calculi, which depend
crucially on information supplied by cognition and context and thus belong to cognitive
psychology rather than to logic. For sentences to express a proposition and thus be inter-
pretable and informative, they must first be properly anchored in context. A proposition
has a truth value when it is, moreover, properly keyed in the world, i.e. is about a situation
in the world. Section 2 deals with the logical properties of natural language. It argues that
presuppositional phenomena require trivalence and presents the trivalent logic PPC3, with
two kinds of falsity and two negations. It introduces the notion of -space for a sentence
A (or /A/, the set of situations in which A is true) as the basis of logical model theory, and
the notion of /PA/ (the -space of the presuppositions of A), functioning as a ‘private’
subuniverse for /A/. The trivalent Kleene calculus is reinterpreted as a logical account of
vagueness, rather than of presupposition. PPC3 and the Kleene calculus are refinements
of standard bivalent logic and can be combined into one logical system. In Section 3 the
adequacy of PPC3 as a truth-functional model of presupposition is considered more closely
and given a Boolean foundation. In a noncompositional extended Boolean algebra, three
operators are defined: 1a for the conjoined presuppositions of a, a˜ for the complement of a
within 1a , and â for the complement of 1a within Boolean 1. The logical properties of this
extended Boolean algebra are axiomatically defined and proved for all possible models.
Proofs are provided of the consistency and the completeness of the system. Section 4 is a
provisional exploration of the possibility of using the results obtained for a new discourse-
dependent account of the logic of modalities in natural language. The overall result is
a modified and refined logical and model-theoretic machinery, which takes into account
both the discourse-dependency of natural language sentences and the necessity of selecting
a key in the world before a truth value can be assigned.
1 Although the three authors have worked very much in concert, there has been a
clear division of labour. The principal author of the Sections 1 and 2 is Seuren, who
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1. TRUTH AND FALSITY FOR OCCASION SENTENCES
In the classical view, which has been accepted since Aristotle’s day, truth
consists in saying or thinking of what is so, that it is so, and falsity in saying
or thinking of what is not so that it is. Truth and falsity are the truth values
(TVs), and the bearers of these values, the objects that have the property
of being true or false (whether they are objects of speech or of thought) are
called propositions. This is known as the correspondence theory of truth,
and there is little one can say against it, except that it does not give enough.
First of all, if truth is taken to result from correspondence between what
is said or thought and what is the case, it is necessary to specify what the
correspondence consists in. In other words, an analysis must be provided of
what is the case on the one hand, and also of what is said or thought on the
other, and elements of the one analysis must then be mapped onto elements
of the other, in order to define in precise terms under what conditions
there is correspondence. The task of defining such a mapping procedure
has occupied many generations of philosophers, but it was not until the
20th century that it was undertaken in a formally precise way, under the
name of model-theory, in the context of mathematical logic.
Then there is the built-in ambiguity between saying and thinking: are
true or false propositions the result of speech acts or of thought processes?
As is argued in Stegmüller (1957, pp. 16–17) and Seuren (1998b, pp.
12–18), the correct answer is that a proposition, as a bearer of a TV, is
not a linguistic expression, but the result of a mental act of assigning a
property to an entity or n-tuple of entities (where both the property and
the entities in question may be determinable through a complex process
of interpretation). The main argument for this position is the well-known
fact that linguistic utterances, in principle, heavily underdetermine their
truth conditions, and that the missing elements are supplied by available
world and/or situational knowledge. This applies in particular to predic-
ates, whose satisfaction conditions often involve world knowledge. For
example, the satisfaction conditions of the predicate flat are different in
The front tire was flat and The road surface was flat. Or, to vary on Ryle
(1949, p. 24), the prepositional predicate in is satisfied under quite different
conditions in, for example, She went out in a red hat and She went out in a
sports car.
is also responsible for the notion of 1a as a noncompositional unary operator on a and
accordingly differentiated complement functions. Capretta and Geuvers cast these ideas in
a proper mathematical format, with definitions, axioms and proofs in Section 3. Seuren’s
suggestions for Section 4 were cast in a preparatory mathematical format by Capretta and
Geuvers. All three authors are indebted to Henk Barendregt (Department of Computer
Science, Nijmegen University) for his overall support and critical comments.
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Truth thus seems to be primarily a cognitive, and not a verbal, notion.
This point is important because logic has always, mainly due to the obvi-
ous difficulty of analysing thoughts as against the relative accessibility of
linguistic structures, operated with a verbal notion of truth, and we shall
see presently that this imposes certain limitations.
A third problem lies in the fact that many sentences of natural lan-
guages, if taken by themselves and out of context, cannot be assigned a
TV. A sentence like:
(1) The girl was right after all.
is a good grammatical sentence of English, with proper English lexical
forms, with a subject term and a finite verb form in proper agreement with
the subject term, in the simple past tense and with an adjunct of time. But
it makes no sense to ask whether it is true or false, until it is known what
person is referred to by the subject term, when the event is said to have
taken place, and what the issue was that the girl is said to have been right
about. We say that this sentence needs a key in the real world before it can
be assigned a TV.
Sentences that need a key are called occasion sentences, whereas
sentences that don’t are called eternal sentences (Quine 1960). Eternal sen-
tences are, in principle, presented in a generic (present) tense and contain
no definite but only quantified terms. Thus, a sentence like:
(1) All humans are mortal.
is an eternal sentence and, consequently, it makes perfect sense to ask
whether it is true or false, regardless of any context. No specific key is
needed in such cases.
Both Aristotelian and modern logic are based exclusively on eternal
sentences, the reason being that occasion sentences turn out to pose a num-
ber of apparently intractable problems for a sound logic, problems which
do not turn up with eternal sentences. Aristotle decided (Metaph 1027a-b)
to ban all occasion sentences from his metaphysics and his logic, probably
because of the baffling complications which he saw coming with regard
to occasion sentences. There is an alternative logical tradition, running
from the Stoa through the Middle Ages to the late 19th century, where
attempts are made to take occasion sentences into account as well, but this
tradition has dried up since 1900, mainly because it was shown in Russell
and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica that the new Predicate Calculus,
restricted as it is to eternal sentences with its quantifiers, variables and
logical connectives, is sufficient to express any mathematical proposition.
534 PIETER A. M. SEUREN ET AL.
From then on, attempts to account for occasion sentences were given up
and logic was exclusively about eternal sentences.
1.1. The Translation Method is Inadequate as a Solution for Occasion
Sentences
While the fact that all mathematical propositions can be expressed in terms
of eternal sentences in the Russellian Language of Predicate Calculus
(LPC) is no doubt of extreme importance, the question of how to determine
truth and falsity for occasion sentences, as well as that of their logical
properties, remains. The answer provided by modern logic is, in principle,
that all occasion sentences must be ‘translated’ into eternal sentences for
which such problems do not exist. This is the basis of the programme initi-
ated by Russell and continued by Quine, who dubbed it the programme of
‘elimination of particulars’ (Quine 1960). This programme, which under-
lies virtually all the work done in present-day model-theoretic or ‘formal’
semantics, is based on two (usually implicit) assumptions. The first is that
the ‘translations’ provided are semantically equivalent to the sentences that
have been translated, and the second implies that the logical translations
provided will be powerful enough to express any proposition a speaker
wishes to express when using a natural language.
These two assumptions have not remained unchallenged. One import-
ant problem, directly relevant to the second assumption, but indirectly also
to the first, is posed by the so-called ‘donkey sentences’, so called because
of a number of example sentences presented by the British philosopher
Walter Burley (±1275–after 1344) in the context of his theory of refer-
ence, all containing mention of a donkey. Among Burley’s examples is the
following (Burley 1988, p. 92):
(3) Omnis homo habens asinum videt illum. (every man who has a
donkey sees it)
Burley’s problem was that a sentence like (3) will still be true if some man
has two donkeys, one that he sees and one that he does not see, as long as
every donkey owner has at least one donkey he does see. This would mean
that a sentence like ‘Some man who has a donkey does not see it’ would
be compatible with (3) and not be its contradictory. In modern times, the
problem was brought up by Geach (1962, pp. 116ff), who re-used Burley’s
examples (speaking of ‘another sort of medieval example’, but without
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mentioning Burley). Geach’s donkey-examples were in turn picked up by
modern formal semanticists, who found that sentences of the types:
(4)a. If George owns a donkey he feeds it.
b. Every farmer who owns a donkey feeds it.
c. Either George does not own a donkey or he feeds it.
cannot be translated into LPC, which allows for only two kinds of terms,
(bound) variables and constant terms that refer to a reference object. The
pronoun it in (4a–c) cannot be a constant term since it has no reference
object, so it must be a variable. But as a variable it cannot be bound,
unless more radical logical translations are provided. Thus, (4a–c) might
conceivably be translated as, respectively:
(5)a. ∀x[Donkey(x)→ [Own(George, x)→ Feed(George, x)]]
b. ∀x∀y[[Farmer(x) ∧ Donkey(y) ∧ Own(x, y)] → Feed(x, y)]
c. ¬∃x[Donkey(x) ∧ Own(George, x)] ∨ ∃x[Donkey(x) ∧
Own(George, x) ∧ Feed(George, x)]
Such translations, however, run into considerable problems. First, from a
strictly linguistic point of view, there is the problem of the nonuniformity
of translations, since a noun phrase like a donkey is to be translated as an
existentially quantified expression in, for example, (4c) or George owns
a donkey, but as a universally quantified expression in (4a,b). This would
violate Russell’s ‘parity of form’ criterion (1905, p. 483). Moreover, as
was observed by Burley, (4b) allows for some farmer to own two donkeys,
one that he feeds and one he does not feed, whereas (5b) is false in such a
case.
Furthermore, it does not seem tenable that the pronoun it in (4a–c) rep-
resents a bound variable. This is so because it is typical for pronouns that
do represent bound variables that they cannot be replaced with a so-called
epithet pronoun, like the great man or the idiot or the wretched animal.
Thus, in a sentence like (6a) the bound variable pronoun they cannot be
replaced with an epithet, as in (6b), without the binding relation being
destroyed:
(6)a. Some people think that they will get rich without working.
b. 
= Some people think that the layabouts will get rich without
working.
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In (4a–c), however, the occurrences of it can all give way to an epithet
without any referential consequences:
(7)a. If George owns a donkey he feeds the wretched animal.
b. Every farmer who owns a donkey feeds the wretched animal.
c. Either George does not own a donkey or he feeds the wretched
animal.
This strongly suggests that the occurrences of it in (4a–c) are not to be
analysed as bound variables but as referring expressions of some kind,
even if this kind of referring expression is not known in LPC.
Thirdly, translations of the type (5a–c) fail to satisfy when intensional
operators are built into the sentences in question, as in:
(8)a. If John thinks that George owns a donkey, he is certain that
George feeds it.
b. Every farmer who is known to own a donkey, is thought to feed
it.
c. Either John thinks that George does not own a donkey or he is
certain that George feeds it.
If the NP a donkey is translated as a universally quantified expression,
as in (5a,b), the meaning of the sentences in question is distorted beyond
tolerable limits. If, on the other hand, existential quantification is used,
scope problems arise. (5c), moreover, is questionable, as it is not simply the
substitution of ¬A∨ [A∧B] for ¬A∨B, but involves the inclusion of the
propositional function ‘Feed(George, x)’ under the existential quantifier.
(8c) shows that there are serious problems regarding the generality of this
procedure.
This problem of donkey anaphora was the primary motivation behind
Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp and Reyle 1993). A solution in
terms of interpretative subdomains within the framework of Discourse Se-
mantics is found in Seuren (1998a). Both approaches use LPC and both
have extended LPC with definite descriptions and anaphoric devices, thus
rejecting Russellian translations for the cases at hand and reinstating occa-
sion sentences as elements in the semantics. Since the logical properties
of the structures concerned do not seem to be affected by these steps
in any but marginal ways, we shall leave the donkey anaphora problem
undiscussed in the sequel of this paper, relegating its solution to a proper
semantic theory. The emphasis of this paper is on those phenomena that
are typical of occasion sentences and lead to consequences for the logic of
language, such as presuppositions.
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A similar difficulty, showing the weakness of the first assumption, con-
cerns Russell’s (1905) reduction of definite NPs to existentially quantified
expressions as in (9a), translated by him as (9b):
(9)a. The present king of France is bald.
b. ∃x[Now[KoF(x)] ∧ Bald(x) ∧ ∀y[Now[KoF(y)] → x = y]]
Clearly, a sentence like (10a) is not equivalent to any of its possible
Russellian translations (10b–e):
(10)a. Carol thinks that there is a king of France, and she hopes that
he is bald.
b. There is a king of France such that he is the only one and such
that Carol thinks he is there and such that she hopes he is bald.
c. Carol thinks that there is a king of France such that she hopes
that he is the only one and that he is bald.
d. Carol thinks that there is a king of France, and there is a king
of France such that he is the only one and she hopes that he is
bald.
e. Carol thinks that there is a king of France, and she hopes that
there is a king of France such that he is the only one and is bald.
Finally, logical translations in the manner of Russell or Quine fail to
solve the reference problem, which is posed by the fact that definite NPs
often select their reference object in virtue of situational or world know-
ledge, and not on the basis of a Russellian translation as given in (9b).
Under a Russellian translation, (11) is false in cases where there are several
pubs. Yet for the purpose of ordinary language (11) may well be true, as
long as John and Harry met in a particular pub whose identity was known
and taken for granted:
(11) John and Harry met in the pub after work.
This problem is quite general. For example, in a sequence of sentences
like:
(12) The book was published in 1968. The publisher was later sent
to prison.
the definite NP the publisher must refer to the person who published the
book in question in 1968, not to just any (unique!) publisher. LPC is unable
to fix that reference. For it to be able to do that it must (a) be extended with
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a new category of intrinsically referring terms consisting of a predicate
and a definite determiner, and (b) be applied first to contextually restricted
cognitive structures that represent possible situations before any reference
relation and hence TV can be determined.
These and similar arguments point to the following conclusions:
• Occasion sentences cannot be reduced to eternal sentences but must be
recognized in their own right, both in semantics and in logic.
• If LPC is to be used for the representation of semantic content, it must
be extended with at least definite descriptions and anaphoric pronouns.
• Since occasion sentences lack a TV until a key has been selected and
reference values are fixed, and since these processes involve an appeal
to cognition, the primary bearers of TVs are cognitive, not linguistic,
structures. Linguistic utterances are TV-bearers only to the extent that
they express an underlying proposition (thought).
• Only utterance tokens, properly embedded in a context and a situation,
can be said to have a TV. Sentence types have logical and semantic
properties, but, in principle, no TV. Eternal sentence types appear to
have a TV, due to the fact that the contextual and situational embed-
dings required for them to have a TV are unrestricted. They therefore
represent boundary cases. (This conclusion was reached earlier in
Strawson (1950).)
1.2. A Programme for Semantics and for Logic
The conclusions reached in the previous section imply a programme of
research for semantic theory. First of all, a theory must be developed that
specifies the cognitive structures that are taken to contain the primary bear-
ers of TVs. This we call the THEORY OF CONTEXTUAL ANCHORING.
Secondly, a THEORY OF REFERENTIAL KEYING, is needed to specify
how the cognitive structures at issue, and hence the sentence tokens or
utterances that express them, can be keyed to a given situation. The over-
all architecture into which these theories are meant to fit is schematically
rendered in Figure 1.
The double arrow on the left hand side signifies a two-sided causal
relation, in the sense that utterance tokens are produced from, or integrated
into, cognitive discourse domains by means of cerebral and neuromuscular
processes. The double arrow on the right hand side signifies a relation
whose nature is conceptually less clear. Philosophers often speak of an
intentional relation, which means, in principle, that the cognitive structure
is intended to be a representation of, or ‘be about’, an actual situation in the
world. The notion of a cognitive representation or discourse domain D is












Figure 1. The triangular relation of language, mind and world
far from unproblematic and requires a thorough analysis of basic concepts.
Yet in principle it appears to be amenable to standard methods of scientific
analysis.
In essence, D is a structured set of structures (propositions) of the type
P(e), where e is an element symbol and P a property symbol, semantically
defined by satisfaction conditions. If e stands for (refers to) an entity (in the
widest possible sense) in the real world W and P stands for a well-defined
property that real world entities may have, a particular proposition P(e) is
either true or false, according to whether the entity referred to by e does or
does not have the property that P stands for. D may also not be about any
real situation in the world at all, in which case it is not ‘keyed’ and has no
truth value. In that case the P(e)-structures of D are, though contextually
anchored, not keyed to a real world situation and are thus propositions
without a TV. They are, so to speak, representations in search of a key.
Even more profound problems are raised by the notion of intention.
To say that a proposition P(e) is intended to be a representation of, or
‘be about’, an actual world situation is comprehensible in an intuitive
sense, but is, as yet, not expressible in terms of causal relations and not
implementable in an algorithmic model. Intentionality thus described is a
mental phenomenon that still escapes the notions available in science and
mathematics. For that reason it is a central and highly problematic notion
in the philosophy of mind.
The intentional relation of situational keying may, however, lead to
causal effects, in that the world situation may codetermine the represent-
ation(s) of the discourse domain (for example, when a speaker wants to
describe a given situation), while, on the other hand, particular configur-
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ations in the discourse domain may be a determining factor in bringing
about their real world counterparts (as when an order is followed).
One notes that there is no direct connection, in Figure 1, between
‘Utterance token’ and ‘Situation’. In Ogden and Richards (1923, p. 11)
a similar triangular disposition is presented for the relation between lan-
guage, the mind, and the world. There a dotted line, drawn between the
linguistic utterance and the world (situation), signifies a noncausal but
merely ‘imputed’ relation determining the TV to be assigned. In the light
of the arguments presented in Section 1.1, it is now clear that this ‘imputed’
relation is based on a purely verbal notion of truth which can perhaps be
made to work for eternal sentences but not for occasion sentences. It fails
to take into account the fact that TVs can only be assigned to occasion
sentences with the help of cognition.
Cognition, in the form of available world knowledge and discourse
structure, supplies elements that are missing from the spoken signal (the
utterance of an occasion sentence) but are necessary for a proper interpreta-
tion and for the assignment of a TV. These elements need not be expressed
verbally, because the listener is taken to be in possession of the neces-
sary world knowledge and to be a participant in the discourse structure
at hand. Compared to a language that allows only for eternal sentences,
a language that contains occasion sentences is thus seen to be superbly
functional in that it saves an enormous amount of time and energy in the
verbal expression of propositions.
The relation between logic, semantics and cognitive psychology is now
different from what it was before. Traditionally, logic is the formal cal-
culus of necessary consequences (entailments) given the truth of (sets of)
propositions. In terms of this definition, there should be two kinds of logic,
a cognitive logic based on thought structures, and a verbal logic based on
linguistic structures. Since cognitive logic is still far beyond our reach,
we shall, in the following, restrict ourselves to verbal logic, as is standard
practice. But this means that if any verbal logic aims at handling occasion
sentences, it will be unable to provide a concomitant formal theory assign-
ing correct TVs. In other words, there will be no compositional calculus
that assigns TVs to sentences in a model merely on the strength of sentence
structure and model-theoretic interpretation, as is possible, in principle, for
eternal sentences. Truth conditions, moreover, will have to be formulated
partly in terms of parameters whose values are to be supplied by cognition.
For natural language with its occasion sentences, the process of TV-
assignment is of a cognitive nature and falls, strictly speaking, within
the province of cognitive psychology, outside logic and its applications
in formal semantics. To the extent that established formal semantics in-
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volves a formal procedure for the assignment of TVs to natural language
sentences, it must be considered not viable. In the light of the proper-
ties of occasion sentences discussed so far, it seems more appropriate to
restrict semantics, in principle, to the study of the contextual anchoring
properties of sentence types in discourse structures. Semantics, in other
words, being the theory of linguistic comprehension, studies the building
up of cognitive structures that consist of propositions each of which carries
truth conditions but not necessarily a truth value. To decide how and when
these conditions are satisfied in a given situation is a matter of cognitive
psychology, which has, so far, not provided a formal theory.
Note that the term proposition will be used, from now on, for subject-
predicate structures that are well-anchored in context and thus contribute
to a meaningful text. If a proposition is also properly keyed to a situation,
it will have a TV, but it need not have one to be meaningful.
For an uttered sentence token S to have a TV it must satisfy two global
conditions: (a) S must be contextually anchored, and (b) S must be keyed
to a situation in the world. When only condition (a) is fulfilled but not
condition (b), S is part of a meaningful text thought up by an author, but
its TV is irrelevant. Or, in Frege’s words:
Why is the thought not enough for us? Because, and to the extent that, we are concerned
with its truth value. This is not always the case. In hearing an epic poem, for instance,
apart from the euphony of the language we are interested only in the sense of the sentences
and the images and feelings thereby aroused. The question of truth would cause us to
abandon aesthetic delight for an attitude of scientific investigation. Hence it is a matter of
no concern to us whether the name Odysseus, for instance, has reference, so long as we
accept the poem as a work of art. It is the striving for truth that drives us always to advance
from the sense to the reference.
Frege (1892, p. 33) translation by Max Black in Geach and Black (1970, p. 63)
When not even condition (a) is fulfilled, S is unanchored and hence un-
interpretable, but still meaningful in the general sense that it may play a
role in the building up of cognitive structures consisting of propositions
and possibly carrying a TV. Although these conditions apply to occasion
sentences in particular, we shall henceforth speak of sentences in general,
since eternal sentences are considered boundary cases, whose anchoring
and keying conditions are always met. In Section 1.3 condition (a) is
discussed. Condition (b) is discussed in Section 1.4.
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1.3. Contextual Anchoring and Presuppositions
For a sentence S to be contextually anchored (or be part of a coherent
discourse) it must satisfy at least the following necessary conditions:
a. Every definite term in S has a unique denotation (address) in the
discourse domain D.
b. All presuppositions of S are incremented in D before S.
Following a by now widely accepted view, we consider a discourse
domain D to be a structured representation of an ordered set of sentences.
A D must contain at least a number of ‘addresses’ representing possible
objects (singular or plural, natural individuals or reifications). Every new
well-anchored sentence is incremented in D in that the new information
provided by S is added to D. The precise format in which one may best
take this to be done is not our concern here. Two main strategies present
themselves: either the predicate label expressing the property assigned by
S is added to the appropriate addresses that correspond to the definite terms
in S, or the appropriate address labels are added to the predicate label. A
combination of both is also thinkable. New addresses are introduced by
means of existential quantification.
Condition (a) requires that D be structured in such a way that each
definite term in S corresponds uniquely to an address in D. For definite
descriptions (e.g. the house) this means that the determiner the seeks the
unique address in D that is characterized by the predicate house. Definite
pronouns need to find a proper antecedent, i.e. an address recently activated
by explicit mentioning. If a definite description fails to find an address in
D, the missing address can be supplied on grounds of knowledge-based
inference, as is demonstrated in (12) above for the definite description the
publisher. For pronouns this is, normally speaking, not possible (try to read
(12) with he for the publisher).
Condition (b) is to do with presuppositions. We consider a presuppos-
ition to be a proposition P implied in, and structurally recoverable from,
a sentence S (its ‘carrier sentence’) in such a way that P must precede S
in D for S to be interpretable. A presupposition P of a carrier sentence S
thus poses a condition on D for the meaningfulness or interpretability of S
or the simple negation of S.
Four main categories of presupposition can be distinguished:
i. Existential presuppositions, as in (‘’ stands for ‘presupposes’):
(13) John took his son to the
Zoo.
 John exists; John has a
son; there is a Zoo
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ii. Factive presuppositions (presupposing the truth of the that-clause),
as in:
(14) John noticed that he was
getting wet.
 John was getting wet
iii. Categorial presuppositions, implied in the meaning of the predicate,
as in:
(15)a. David is divorced.  David was married before
b. David has stopped beating
his dog.
 David has beaten his dog
before
iv. Remainder category, to do with focusing strategies and the particles
only and even, as in:
(16)a. JOHN didn’t laugh,
HARRY did.
 Somebody laughed
b. Only John laughed.  John laughed
It makes sense, however, to assume that for all categories of presupposition
the semantic source of the presuppositions of a sentence S is, in principle,
located in the satisfaction conditions of the highest predicate of S (see
Section 2.3.1 below). In light of the observations made in 2.3.1 below,
it seems advisable, if not inevitable, to distinguish between two classes
of satisfaction conditions, the preconditions, whose nonsatisfaction results
in RADICAL FALSITY, and the update conditions, whose nonsatisfaction
results in MINIMAL FALSITY. Satisfaction of all conditions yields truth.
From a purely logical point of view, presupposition is then a lexically
driven entailment, induced by lexical preconditions. The reduction to lex-
ical satisfaction conditions is straightforward for the categories (i)–(iii).
For category (iv) it is possible only if, at a level of semantic analysis,
particles like only or even are considered focusing predicates and a specific
focusing predicate is assumed for contrastive accents and other contrastive
or emphatic focusing strategies such as clefting. This aspect of presup-
positional analysis, however, will not be gone into further in the present
context.
Since a sentence SP (i.e. S presupposing P ) requires P to be incre-
mented in D before S, a speaker asserting SP cannot be committed to the
truth of S without also being committed to the truth of P , on analytical
grounds, i.e. grounds of meaning. It follows that if S  P , then S  P .
Moreover, since under normal conditions the contextual anchoring condi-
tions of a sentence S are identical to those of its negation not-S, a speaker
asserting not-SP cannot be committed to the truth of not-S without also
being committed to the truth of P . Hence, if S  P , then not-S  P . We
thus formulate as a logical condition for presupposition (applicable under
the default conditions):
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(17) If S  P , then S  P and not-S  P .
But this poses a problem for the logic of language, since in standard logic,
if S  P and not-S  P , P must be a necessary truth. In language,
however, presuppositions are as contingent as any other proposition. This
problem is solved in Section 2.3.3 below, where the trivalent propositional
calculus PPC3 is presented.
It is is important to realize that a description of the logical properties of
presupposition does not automatically give a semantic definition. On the
contrary, a sound logic is a necessary but not a sufficient property for a
sound natural language semantics (see Section 2.3.5). It is thus possible
for a pair of sentences A and B to satisfy all the logical conditions of
the semantic relation of presupposition without the one presupposing the
other. Conversely, however, if A B, then A and B must show the appro-
priate logical properties defined in PPC3. The semantic dimensions that go
beyond logic are not explored here.
It must be noted that existential presupposition differs from denota-
tional anchoring (condition (a)), in that the latter is required by definite
terms looking for a unique address in D, whereas the former is induced by
the predicate in question, which may or may not require real existence for
one or all of its term referents. Thus, a sentence like John is talking about
the Abominable Snowman requires the availability of a unique address for
the description the Abominable Snowman (condition (a)), but it does not
presuppose the existence of such a creature, since the predicate talk about
does not require real existence of its object term referent (it is intensional
with respect to its object term). For D this implies that the expression the
Abominable Snowman may seek its denotation address in some intensional
subdomain representing somebody’s belief or story, in case the main (or
truth) domain lacks an appropriate address.
Since presuppositions are structurally recoverable from their carrier
sentences, it is, in principle, not necessary to present presuppositions ex-
plicitly, in the form of actual utterance tokens. For any SP , it is sufficient to
pronounce only S, since P can be, and very often is, cognitively ‘slipped
in’ when S is processed. This process is called ACCOMMODATION or
POST HOC INSERTION (PHI). The process of PHI is blocked only in cases
where it would result in an inconsistent D or where implicit relations lack
sufficient cognitive backing. The latter is illustrated in, for example,
(18) When John entered the house, the corridor started to pray.
Supposing that John and the house are already ‘in the story’, the corridor
is easily supplied by PHI, since it is normal for houses to have corridors
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John realizes that Mary’s best friend is divorced
There is a person called ‘John’ Mary’s best friend is divorced
Mary’s best friend was married before
Mary has a best friend
There is a person called ‘Mary’
Figure 2. The presuppositional structure of (19).
and one may expect a listener to know that. But it is not normal for cor-
ridors to pray, and any such relation will have to be explained first for an
utterance of (18) to be interpretable. Failing such an explanation, (18) is
not interpretable.
Most normal texts contain a multitude of presuppositions ‘slipped in’
by PHI. Given the relatively large amounts of time and energy involved in
the actual production and comprehension of utterance tokens, the mech-
anism of PHI constitutes a powerful energy-saving device. It is important
to realize, however, that this device is crucially dependent on the cognitive
ability to detect inconsistencies and on available background knowledge.
The presuppositions of a sentence may be parallel or stacked. For
example, a sentence like:
(19) John realizes that Mary’s best friend is divorced.
has the parallel presuppositions ‘There is a person called “John”’ and
‘Mary’s best friend is divorced’. The latter, however, again presupposes
‘Mary’s best friend was married before’, which presupposes ‘Mary has a
best friend’, which again presupposes ‘There is a person called “Mary”’.
These presuppositions thus stand in the structural relationship to each other
shown in Figure 2 (where ‘A → B’ means ‘A is presupposed by B’). All
these presuppositions are recoverable from the carrier sentence (12) and
can thus be ‘slipped in’ by means of PHI, in the proper order. We remark
here that PHI inserts all hereditary presuppositions of the sentence. For the
example sentence (19) this implies that all sentences in Figure 2 that are
below sentence (19) are inserted by PHI. This conforms with the fact that
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the presuppositions of the presuppositions of a sentence S are themselves
presuppositions of S.
Apart from a few late 19th century admonitions (e.g., Sidgwick 1895)
to the effect that context and discourse should be considered essential
factors in any adequate semantic theory of natural language, the first
modern proposals to this effect go back to the early 1970s, in particu-
lar Seuren (1972, 1975), Stalnaker (1973), Isard (1975). They were soon
followed by a spate of theories and proposals that share the property of
being incremental (and thus tend at least to consider a rehabilitation of
occasion sentences) but differ widely in other respects, notably McCawley
(1979), Van den Auwera (1979), Ballmer (1979), Lewis (1979), Wunder-
lich (1979), Karttunen and Peters (1979), Gazdar (1979), Kamp (1981),
Heim (1982, 1983), Barwise and Perry (1983), Fauconnier (1985), Land-
man (1986), Burton-Roberts (1989), Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991),
Kamp and Reyle (1993), and many others. While many of these do rein-
state definite descriptions in the (explicit or implicit) logical analysis, thus
opening the way towards satisfying condition (a) mentioned at the outset
of this section, only very few take condition (b), which is about presuppos-
itions, into account. And to the extent that they do, only a few consider the
logical aspects of presupposition, the others being restricted either, rather
myopically, to so-called projection phenomena (which fall outside any lo-
gical analysis) or to largely informal pragmatic analyses, or both. The only
remaining approach that considers both presuppositions and their strictly
logical aspects, Burton-Roberts (1989), is only remotely incremental and,
moreover, just like all other approaches, fails to take into account the spe-
cific observations presented in 2.3.1 below and published earlier in Seuren
(1985, 1988) and elsewhere (for a detailed critique of Burton-Roberts 1989
see Seuren 1990). It is precisely these facts that call for a specific trivalent
logic with two kinds of falsity (PPC3). A similar conclusion was reached
in Dummett (1973, p. 421) on comparable but not identical grounds (see
below), but neither Dummett’s nor Seuren’s argument was ever acknow-
ledged in the literature on presuppositions. Therefore, in spite of the many
interesting aspects of the literature at hand, none of it is relevant for the
present more restricted purpose, which is to reinstate occasion sentences
and to investigate their logical and mathematical foundations in a way that
takes account of all relevant facts.
1.4. Situational Keying and Reference Fixation
Every S has to be keyed to a situation for it to have a TV. A key consists in
the specification of where to look for verification or falsification. No theory
has been developed so far to account for either the speaker’s intentional
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keying in to a particular situation in the real world W, or the listener’s
adequate picking up of the intended key. For the listener this appears not
to be a strictly compositional process, but rather a matter of hypothesis
and approximation. Unrestricted truth is anyway not a sufficient criterion.
If it were, a complete fleshing out of all presuppositions of an occasion
sentence by means of PHI, as illustrated in Figure 2, would be sufficient to
provide all occasion sentences with a TV without any intentional keying.
It would then, for example, be sufficient for the truth of (19) that there
be persons called ‘John’ and ‘Mary’, respectively, that Mary have a best
friend who was married before but is now divorced, while John realizes all
that. But although there may be many situations in the actual world that
satisfy these conditions, this does not make (19) true. The truth or falsity
of (19) requires a prior intentional focusing on a particular situation shared
by speaker and listener. As a matter of principle, TVs are predicated on
prior keying, and this fact must be taken into account in any theory of
truth and meaning, as well as in an adequate logic of natural language
sentences. Formal philosophical, semantic and logical theories of natural
languages are thus subservient more to formal analyses of cognition than
to mathematical logic. The role of the latter is still highly relevant, but
more restricted than is standardly thought.
It is now clear that straightforward-looking instances of eternal sen-
tences, such as There isn’t a person called ‘John’ or Everybody wants
lower taxes, can be true even if there is, somewhere in the big wide world,
a person called ‘John’ or someone of whom it is not true to say that he or
she wants lower taxes. To say that the truth or falsity of such statements
is pragmatically restricted to certain situations may well be correct, under
an appropriate definition of the term ‘pragmatic’, but it is not very enlight-
ening unless the full consequences are drawn for the theory of truth and
meaning, and for a proper logic of natural language sentences.
It is probably correct to say that the fixation of reference comes after
the fixation of a key, i.e., the intentional focusing on a specific situation.
This appears from the fact that key-restricted truth is sometimes used as a
means for the fixing of reference. This phenomenon, described in Seuren
(1985, pp. 459–464) as ‘nonspecific reference’, is illustrated by a sentence
like:
(20) John owns a dog, and it bit him.
uttered with respect to a situation where a person called ‘John’ owns two
dogs, one that bit him and one that did not. In that situation (20) is true, and
it is so in virtue of the fact that the definite term it automatically selects the
dog that satisfies the conditions of the predicate bit him, so that the second
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conjunct is true. That is, the reference of it (or of John’s dog) is made
dependent on the truth of the proposition ‘it (John’s dog) bit him’. This
means that the sentence:
(21) John owns a dog, and it did not bite him.
is likewise true in the same situation, because in this case the reference
object of it is the dog that did not bite him. This fact is remarkable because
truth is here used as a criterion for the fixing of reference given a situational
key. For the second conjuncts of (20) and (21) to be true it is sufficient for
there to be, in the situation at hand, a dog that did, or did not, bite John,
respectively.
This puzzling fact was noticed by Walter Burley, as was shown in con-
nection with example (3) above, and is specifically discussed in Geach
(1969) (though again without attribution). Beyond that, however, it has
escaped the attention of modern philosophy, probably because it has been
assumed that Geach’s solution to the problem is adequate. Geach’s solu-
tion amounts to ‘translating’ (20) and (21) not as a conjunction of two
propositions, i.e. as A ∧ B, but as, respectively
(22)a. ∃x[Dog(x) ∧ Own(John, x) ∧ Bite(x, John)]
b. ∃x[Dog(x) ∧ Own(John, x) ∧ ¬Bite(x, John)]
so that inconsistency is avoided. It was shown, however, in Seuren (1977)
that this solution is inadequate since it does not apply to cases where
intensional operators are involved, as in:
(23)a. John must have owned a dog, and it may have bitten him.
b. John must have owned a dog, and it cannot have bitten him.
Both (23a) and (23b) may be true at the same time, provided John owned
at least two dogs. But Geach’s solution does not apply, due to scope prob-
lems. If it is taken to represent a variable bound by an existential quantifier
∃x, as in (22a,b), then the operators ‘possible’ in (23a) and ‘not-possible’
in (23b) must be in the scope of ∃x. But ∃x itself is in the scope of the
necessity operator must, in the normal interpretation of (23a,b). It follows
that may and cannot must likewise be in the scope of must, which is clearly
not what these sentences mean. It is, therefore, impossible to bind it in the
cases quoted, which makes Geach’s solution invalid for these cases. This
conclusion is reinforced by the observation that the pronoun it in (20) and
(21) can be replaced with an epithet, as in:
(24)a. John owns a dog, and the animal bit him.
b. John owns a dog, and the animal did not bite him.
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which, as we have seen, appears to be impossible for pronouns represent-
ing bound variables.
The consequences of the phenomenon of nonspecific reference are
startling. First, the Language of Predicate Calculus must be extended at
least with pronominal definite terms that are not bound variables. Secondly,
and more importantly, even if that is done, the standard model-theoretic
calculus by which TVs are computed on the basis of the extensions of
terms and predicates in the model cannot be upheld, since here the ex-
tension of some terms is determined by the assumed value ‘true’ for the
proposition at hand, which would make the procedure circular.
The phenomenon of nonspecific reference shows that keying and ref-
erence fixation are cognitive processes in a game of hypothesis and
approximation, and cannot be part of logical model theory. In fact, standard
model-theoretic semantics, to the extent that it takes keying and refer-
ence relations into account (toy models usually do), simply takes these
for granted. But this means that the empirical question of how language
users come to understand and interpret their sentences remains funda-
mentally unsolved in model-theoretic semantics. The Quinean programme
of reformulating occasion sentences as eternal sentences is an attempt at
circumventing this problem, but, as has been shown, to no avail. We must
conclude that natural language semantics is basically different from what
is called ‘semantics’ in logic.
2. THE LOGIC OF OCCASION SENTENCES
2.1. The Logic of Occasion Sentences is Restricted to Prior Selection of
Key and Reference
It is now clear that a formal theory of entailments, i.e., a logic, of natural
language sentences is predicated on the prior selection of a key K and of
reference relations in K. In its simplest form, K is defined by a set I of
individuals in W, within frames of time and place. A discourse is said to
be about K. A new sentence in a discourse may open up a new K, in which
case the discourse is about more than one K. Normal discourses are about
sets of Ks forming a hyperkey. In the present context hyperkeys will be left
out of account, and only simple Ks will be considered.
A key K realizes a particular actual state of affairs or situation sa, but
other situations s might have occurred in K, depending on what relations
obtain in I. We say that K is a set of situations s, one of which is the actual
situation sa.
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If a natural language L is considered to be a set of sentences, not all
sentences of L are interpretable given some K. Only the sentences in a
subset LK of L will be interpretable given K. There is as yet no formal
method for delimiting LK given some L and given some K (hardly surpris-
ing when one realizes the neglect of occasion sentences in modern logic
and semantics). Sentences not belonging to some LK have no truth value
and are, therefore, not objects in any logical calculus.
Each sentence A ∈ LK is associated with the set of situations  ⊆ K
in which A is true, or the -SPACE of A, also written as /A/. Every -
space is a possible fact. When, for some A, /A/ = K, A is necessarily true
in K. When /A/ = ∅, A is necessarily false in K. We call the -space of
a sentence A, or /A/, the extension of A. A sentence A ∈ LK is true just
in case sa ∈ /A/, and false just in case sa /∈ /A/.
2.2. Applications of Boolean Algebra to Standard Propositional Calculus
In his famous article of (1892), Frege decided to apply the distinction
between intension and extension, which had so far been restricted to pre-
dicates, also to sentences. He stipulated that the extension of a sentence A,
or [[A]], should be the truth value of A, whereas the intension of A should
be the thought underlying A in the minds of language users. His reason for
taking TVs as extensions of sentences was one of convenience. According
to Frege, the TV of a sentence can be computed compositionally from the
extensions of its component parts (1892, p. 33–4). Thus, if the extension
of a sentence is taken to be its TV, there is a compositional calculus to
compute the extension of a sentence on the basis of the extensions of its
parts and nothing else. The fact that such a calculus is not available for
the intension (underlying thought) of a sentence makes this extensional
calculus all the more valuable (it is the basis of Montague’s programme of
‘extensionalisation of intensions’). It has been shown above that it is not
correct to say that the TV of a sentence can be computed compositionally
from the extensions of its parts, not even if one limits oneself (which Frege
did not do) to eternal sentences, since the satisfaction conditions of predic-
ates often require an appeal to world knowledge. But Frege did not take
such niceties into account.
A further convenience for Frege was the fact that if TVs are sentence ex-
tensions, Boolean algebra computes the truth functions. All that is needed
is to define ‘truth’ as the value of Boolean 1, and ‘falsity’ as the value
of Boolean 0. Negation (¬) is now interpreted as Boolean complement,
conjunction (∧) as Boolean multiplication, and disjunction (∨) as Boolean
addition. This is the origin of the widespread convention to denote truth
with the symbol ‘1’, and falsity with ‘0’.




[[A ∧ B]] [[B]]· 1 0
[[A]] 1 1 0
0 0 0
[[A ∨ B]] [[B]]+ 1 0
[[A]] 1 1 1
0 1 0
Figure 3. Frege’s application of Boolean algebra to bivalent propositional calculus.
The propositional truth-functional operators now compute as follows.
For any sentences A, B:
• A is true iff [[A]] = 1; A is false iff [[A]] = 0.
• ¬A is true iff [[A]] = 0; ¬A is false iff [[A]] = 1. That is, [[¬A]] =
[[A]].
• [[A ∧ B]] = [[A]] · [[B]] and [[A ∨ B]] = [[A]] + [[B]].
This gives the classical truth tables of Figure 3. However, although this
gives the correct computations for the standard truth functions, it remains
unclear what is meant when one says that a sentence A is true, or false.
All one can say, with Frege, is that a true sentence refers to the VERUM or
‘the True’, whereas a false sentence refers to the FALSUM or ‘the False’.
However, as a basis for a philosophically sophisticated theory of truth (and
meaning), this Fregean application is unsatisfactory and thus open to re-
vision. It requires that the truth values, being extensions, be considered
part of the world with respect to which sentences (propositions) are true or
false. But the VERUM and the FALSUM are hardly defensible as elements
in any ontology, a fact widely recognized in model-theoretic semantics but
left unremedied.
There is, however, a different though, as far as standard bivalent cal-
culus is concerned, logically equivalent notion of sentence extension,
sketched in Section 2.1 above and based on the notion of -space. It was
said there that the extension of a sentence A is a possible fact, or the set of
situations in K in which A is true. This we have decided to call the -space
of A or /A/. The idea originates with Boole (1847, pp. 49–50), but was
never fully elaborated. Kneale and Kneale (1962, p. 43) speak of a ‘perhaps
more interesting’ development. To the extent that one understands Boole’s
few remarks on the matter, it seems that he had in mind an interpretation
where Boolean ‘1’ is the algebraic expression for the universe U, or the
set of all possible situations, of which the actual situation sa is one. ‘0’
is the algebraic expression for the empty set or ∅. For any sentence A
of L, the extension of A, let us say again /A/, is the set of situations in
which A is true. Apparently, Boole did not realize that most sentences of
any natural language are occasion sentences, which means that they are
not true or false per se but only when properly anchored and keyed. This
makes the notion of ‘set of possible situations in which a sentence A is
true’ incoherent. Yet, if this complication is disregarded by always apply-
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ing the logical calculus modulo K, Boole’s notion provides an alternative
to Frege’s notion of sentence extension, which is logically equivalent as
long as the logic is kept strictly bivalent.
Van Fraassen (1971, pp. 88ff) was the first to provide a formal elabor-
ation of Boole’s idea, still in terms of an unrestricted universe U, i.e. the
set of all possible situations, without any contextual or keying restrictions.
For Van Fraassen, a situation is defined by a valuation, i.e. an assignment
of truth values to all sentences of a language L. If L contains n logically
independent sentences, then the number of valuations for L is 2n, with the
two values T (‘true’) and F (‘false’). The -space (for Van Fraassen the
valuation space) of a sentence A, or /A/, is the set of valuations in which
A gets the value T. Clearly, if A  B, then /A/ ⊆ /B/. If A  B, any
valuation where A is valued T and B is valued F is inadmissible, in Van
Fraassen’s terms.
This allows for a Boolean interpretation of standard propositional cal-
culus. Let each constant term in the algebra stand for the -space of a
sentence in the language. Variables ranging over terms thus stand for arbit-
rary -spaces. For any necessarily true sentence Nt in L, /Nt/ = U (read
‘1’). For any necessarily false sentence Nf , /Nf / = ∅ (read ‘0’). /A/ is
the set of valuations (-space) in which A is false. When A is true, the
valuation va describing the actual situation is a member of /A/: va ∈ /A/.
When A is false, va /∈ /A/ and va ∈ /A/. It follows that /¬A/ = /A/.
Thus, when A is false, va ∈ /A/, or va ∈ /¬A/. We now define:
/A ∧ B/ = /A/ · /B/ and: /A ∨ B/ = /A/+ /B/
This likewise gives the classical truth tables in Figure 4, with T for ‘true’




/A ∧ B/ /B/· T F
/A/ T T F
F F F
/A ∨ B/ /B/+ T F
/A/ T T T
F T F
Figure 4. -space application of Boolean algebra to bivalent propositional calculus.
The truth tables are demonstrated more clearly by means of set-
theoretic diagrams (Figure 5). In these diagrams the -spaces and the
corresponding values T and F are positioned in such a way that the
truth tables can be read directly from the diagrams. The same method is
followed in the Figures 9, 10 and 13 below.
In the following section it will be shown that the logic of natural lan-
guage must be at least trivalent, as it distinguishes two different kinds of
falsity. In the light of that distinction, Frege’s notion of TVs as sentence
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/¬A/ = /A/ /A ∧ B/ = /A/ · /B/ /A ∨ B/ = /A/+ /B/
Figure 5. Set-theoretic interpretation of bivalent propositional calculus.
extension and his use of Boolean 1 for truth and Boolean 0 for falsity
cannot be upheld, simply because Boolean 0 does not allow for internal
distinctions. If, however, truth and falsity are treated in terms of -spaces,
there is no problem, since -spaces, being sets, allow for further internal
distinctions. From now on, therefore, we shall use Van Fraassen’s -space
application of Boolean algebra as the formal foundation of propositional
calculus, with one important difference. Since it makes no sense to say of
occasion sentences that they are true or false per se, for any given situation,
without specifying how they are anchored and keyed, we shall not speak
of the universe U of all possible situations, but rather of the key K of all
possible situations in which the sentences of LK are true or false. The
‘universe of discourse’, in other words, is not the unfathomable totality
of all possible situations (‘worlds’), with all the conceptual, logical and
ontological problems that come with it, but the rather more manageable set
of possible states of affairs within the restricted part of the world focused
upon by means of the intentional mental act of keying. Apart from that, Van
Fraassen’s analysis can be maintained in its entirety, since the underlying
mathematics remains the same.
2.3. The Logic of Presupposition
2.3.1. Presupposition Requires Trivalence
In this section an empirical argument is proposed to the effect that the
logic of natural language cannot be bivalent but must at least be trivalent,
with two different kinds of falsity. Before the argument can be presen-
ted, the notion of bivalence has to be stated with some precision. The
Aristotelian PRINCIPLE OF BIVALENCE, also known as the PRINCIPLE
OF THE EXCLUDED THIRD (PET), applies first and foremost to the Ar-
istotelian theory of truth as correspondence. Its application to logic is
secondary. For Aristotle, truth and falsity are properties of propositions
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expressed in sentences, in such a way that PET holds. PET consists of the
following two independent subprinciples:
i. PRINCIPLE OF COMPLETE VALUATION: all propositions always have
a truth value.
ii. PRINCIPLE OF BINARITY: there are exactly two truth values, ‘true’
and ‘false’; there are no values in between, and no values outside
‘true’ and ‘false’. The Principle of Binarity comprises the PRINCIPLE
OF THE EXCLUDED MIDDLE (PEM), which says only that there are
no values between ‘true’ and ‘false’, and says nothing about possible
values beyond simply ‘true’ and ‘false’.
The Principle of Complete Valuation holds trivially if one follows the
tradition, which says that to have a truth value is a defining feature of a
proposition. Then, obviously, it makes no sense to speak of propositions
without a truth value. Under our definition, however, of a proposition as a
subject-predicate structure that is contextually anchored, it makes a great
deal of sense. For now the Principle of Complete Valuation implies that
keying is not necessary and that all anchored sentences are automatically
keyed. It has been argued that this must be considered incorrect.
The Principle of Binarity, on the other hand, can be rejected in a number
of ways. One may, for example, wish to reject the Principle of the Excluded
Middle or PEM, and maintain that the opposition between true and false is
not, as Aristotle insisted it was, absolute, like that between locked and un-
locked, but gradable, like that between polite and impolite. An elaboration
of this notion leads to what is known as ‘fuzzy logic’ (Zadeh 1975), which
allows for an infinite number of values between ‘true’ and ‘false’. When
all intermediate values are taken together as one intermediate third value,
the result is a trivalent logic with an intermediate value between ‘true’
and ‘false’, such as the trivalent logic devised by Kleene (1938, 1952)
(although Kleene did not set up his trivalent logic with this purpose in
mind). Such logics defy PEM and hence the Principle of Binarity.
A different way of rejecting the Principle of Binarity, mentioned earlier
in Section 1.3, consists in distinguishing different kinds of falsity. An
example may illustrate this. Suppose a quiz master asks the question:
Which of these four was the youngest president ever of the
United States:
Reagan, Jefferson, Kennedy or De Gaulle?
The correct answer is, of course, ‘Kennedy’. But of the three incorrect
answers, one is somehow more incorrect than the other two. The answer De
Gaulle was the youngest president ever of the US is somehow ‘worse’ than
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the answers that mention Reagan or Jefferson, because De Gaulle does not
even fulfill the preliminary condition of having been president of the US.
It is possible, or thinkable, to exploit this difference theoretically by dis-
tinguishing two kinds of satisfaction conditions, the PRECONDITIONS and
the UPDATE CONDITIONS. The extension of the predicate be the youngest
president of the US can thus roughly be specified as follows:
[[be the youngest president of the US]] = {x : x is or was president of
the US | there is no y such
that y is or was president
of the US and y is or was
younger than x}
The conditions between the colon and the upright stroke are the precon-
ditions. Those after the upright stroke are the update conditions. Failure
to satisfy the preconditions results in RADICAL FALSITY (F2). Failure to
satisfy the update conditions results in MINIMAL FALSITY (F1). Satisfac-
tion of all conditions results in TRUTH (T). The preconditions, moreover,
determine the PRESUPPOSITIONS of the sentence in question. In this
perspective, the sentence De Gaulle was the youngest president ever of
the US presupposes that De Gaulle was president of the US. Since this
presupposition is false, the sentence is radically false.
The argument here is that the behaviour of sentence negation in natural
language, in connection with presuppositions, makes it mandatory to dis-
tinguish between minimal falsity and radical falsity in the way indicated.
The first proposal to this effect was made in Dummett (1973, p. 421), also
on grounds of presupposition and negation, though more from a philo-
sophical than from an observational angle. (Dummett also considers the
possibility of two kinds of truth, a suggestion that should be taken seri-
ously but is not elaborated here.) An actual trivalent propositional calculus
(PPC3) was provided in Seuren (1985, 1988).
Since, under the Principle of Binarity, all situations (whether in U or
in K) are such that either A or ¬A is true, it follows that when A  B
and also ¬A  B, B must be a necessary truth (true in all situations of
either U or K). In empirical terms this means that if it can be established
that in natural language a sentence A as well as its negation not-A both
entail a sentence B which is not a necessary truth (in U or in K), then
natural language not cannot correspond to the bivalent negation operator
¬ of standard propositional calculus. If not is to be rendered in the logic of
language as a truth-functional operator, room must be created for a third
option, besides standard truth and falsity, the ‘third’ excluded by PET.
The point now is that there are many sentence pairs (A, not-A) in nat-
ural language, such that both A and not-A entail a sentence B which is not
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a necessary truth in any sense of the term. Examples are given in (25)–(31)
below (similar observations are presented and commented upon in much
grater detail in Seuren 1985, 1988, 2000). In all such cases the shared
entailment B is a presupposition of A as well as of not-A.
(25)a. All children laughed.  there were children
b. Not all children laughed.  there were children
(26)a. Only the children laughed.  the children laughed
b. Not only the children laughed.  the children laughed
(27)a. The BUTLER killed Jack.  someone killed Jack
b. The BUTLER didn’t kill Jack
(JOE did).
 someone killed Jack
(28)a. It was the BUTLER that killed Jack.  someone killed Jack
b. It wasn’t the BUTLER that killed Jack.  someone killed Jack
(29)a. Who killed Jack was the BUTLER.  someone killed Jack
b. Who killed Jack wasn’t the BUTLER.  someone killed Jack
(30)a. That Joe died surprised Susan.  Joe died
b. That Joe died didn’t surprise Susan.  Joe died
(31)a. She doesn’t mind that Joe has left.  Joe has left
b. She DOES mind that Joe has left.  Joe has left
The sentence pairs (25–31) distinguish themselves from the majority of
pairs (A, not-A) in that normally a sentence not-A allows for the cancelling
of presuppositional entailments if the negation word not is given heavy
accent and the whole sentence is placed under an echo-intonation. Thus, in
(32) the presuppositional implication that there is a king of France can be
cancelled under the intonational conditions mentioned. Yet there remains
a more or less strong suggestion or invited inference that there is a king of
France, an inference mistaken by many for an entailment:
(32) The present king of France is not bald.
In his famous work (1905), Russell maintained that (32) does not entail that
there is a king of France, although it suggests it. His solution consisted in
analysing or ‘translating’ (32) in two different ways:
(33)a. ¬∃x[Now[KoF(x)] ∧ Bald(x) ∧ ∀y[Now[KoF(y)] → x = y]]
b. ∃x[Now[KoF(x)] ∧ ¬Bald(x) ∧ ∀y[Now[KoF(y)] → x = y]]
(33a) is the ordinary full sentential negation of (9b), his translation of
(9a), The present king of France is bald, whereas in (33b) the negation is
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restricted to the propositional function ‘Bald(x)’. For reasons best known
to natural language speakers, Russell says, (33b) appears to be preferred
and (33a) appears to be the marked case. Why speakers should have this
preference is left open by Russell. That question was taken up in modern
pragmatics (which has, however, failed to provide an answer).
Leaving aside the question of whether Russell’s ‘translations’ (33a,b)
are justifiable, we must admit that he was right in claiming that (32) is
open to two interpretations, one that saves the presupposition of (9a), and
one that cancels it. If this were the case for all negative sentences in nat-
ural languages, then there would indeed be some point in saying that full
sentential negation, as in (33a), cancels all entailments, so that standard
propositional calculus can stand. It is found, however, in Seuren (1985, pp.
118–238) that there are many cases where the reading expressed in (33a) is
not possible. These are, first, all cases where the sentence negation is not in
its ‘canonical’ position, i.e., in construction with the finite verb, as in (25b)
and (26b). Such ‘out-of-place’ negations, apparently, have no choice but to
preserve all presuppositional entailments. Yet the only possible translation
for these sentences places the negation at the top: in all these cases the
negation is full sentence negation, even though the presuppositional entail-
ments are preserved. Since this is not possible in standard bivalent logic,
something has to be done about the logic.
This fact is illustrated neatly by the following three English sentences
(where the exclamation mark indicates communicational incoherence):
(34)a. He did not only sell his collection of rare books. He only sold
his first edition of Milton.
b. ! Not only did he sell his collection of rare books. He only sold
his first edition of Milton.
c. ! He not only sold his collection of rare books. He only sold his
first edition of Milton.
The sentence He only sold his collection of rare books presupposes that
he sold his collection of rare books and asserts that he sold nothing else.
This presupposition can be cancelled in (34a), where not is in construction
with the finite verb did. However, in (34b,c) not is in different positions,
allowed for by the grammar of English, and here the presupposition cannot
be cancelled, as is borne out by the incoherence of (34b,c). Nor is it pos-
sible to ‘translate’ them in such a way that not is no longer a full sentential
negation.
Returning now to (25a,b), we see that the presupposition that there
were children is maintained under sentence negation, apparently because
not does not occur in the canonical position for sentence negation. One
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realizes, of course, that in standard Predicate Calculus (25a) does not entail
that there were children (though (25b) does on account of the fact that ‘not
all’ is equivalent to ‘some not’, which has existential import). Yet standard
Predicate Calculus does an injustice to natural language in this respect, as
was also recognized by Strawson (1952) and by Aristotle, whose Predicate
Calculus had existential import as a valid inference schema (the ‘subal-
tern’). As is well known, the Aristotelian inference from ‘all’ to ‘some’
leads to logical disaster when empty sets are quantified over, but it is all
right as long as empty sets are avoided. In other words, Aristotelian Predic-
ate Calculus presupposes the nonemptiness of the sets quantified over. This
means that Aristotle implicitly, and no doubt without realizing it, not only
took proper anchoring and keying for granted in his Predicate Calculus,
but also limited it to situations where presuppositions are fulfilled. Under
these restrictions, Aristotelian Predicate Calculus is sound.
The examples (27–29) are to do with focusing in terms of three
syntactically different types of topic-comment structure. Apparently, for
reasons not yet worked out (but surely to do with the principles of coherent
discourse) focusing structures cannot give up their presuppositions under
negation.
Example (30) involves the predicate surprise which is factive with
regard to its subject clause (i.e., the truth of the subject clause is presup-
posed). As long as the subject clause stays in the syntactic position for
subjects, the factive presupposition cannot be shed under negation. By way
of contrast, consider:
(35)a. It surprised Susan that Joe died.  Joe died
b. It did not surprise Susan that Joe died.  Joe died
where (35b) no longer entails that Joe died, since now the ‘radical’
interpretation of not is possible.
In (31) we have to do with the NEGATIVE POLARITY ITEM mind, which
requires either a negative context or contrastive accent, as in (31b), for the
sentence to be grammatical. Negative polarity items, likewise, do not allow
for presuppositions to be dropped under negation.
Cases like (25–31) show that sentence negation does not per se cancel
presuppositional entailments, but clearly preserves them in certain sen-
tence types. This fact shows that the classical bivalent paradigm cannot
be upheld, unless some external remedy is found. In the logic-based the-
ory of model-theoretic semantics it has been hoped, for the past quarter
century, that pragmatics would provide such an external remedy. Yet no
such remedy has been provided. That being so, we feel justified in saying
that it makes sense to look for ways to extend standard bivalent logic in
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such a way that the observations made above are accounted for in logical
terms. The obvious solution would then seem to consist in adding a third
truth value and making the logic trivalent.
2.3.2. Kleene’s Trivalent Calculus
A first notable attempt to do just that was made in Kleene (1938, 1952),
mentioned earlier. Kleene’s trivalent calculus is widely used in logic-
oriented presupposition research (e.g., Blau 1978). Yet closer analysis
reveals that it is unfit for that purpose, although it does serve the differ-
ent purpose of accounting for phenomena to do with transitional values
between true and false.
What Kleene had in mind was a logical account of sentences containing
nonreferring terms, i.e. terms whose proper semantic function is to refer to
a world entity whereas the world does not contain such an entity, precisely
as in Russell’s famous sentence (9a). Such ‘undefined terms’ would make
the sentence have the TV ‘undefined’ or ‘u’. This trivalent calculus, with
the values T, u, and F, works according to the truth tables shown in Figures
6 and 7. One sees that under negation T and F ‘toggle’ in the classical way,
but that u is unaffected by negation, that under conjunction (∧) F takes
precedence over all other values, and u over T, whereas under disjunction
(∨) T takes precedence over all other values, and u over F. In Figure 6, this
leads to the fan-like structure in the tables for ∧ and ∨, with T as the root
of the fan for ∧, and F for ∨. In the equivalent tables of Figure 7 where
u is ordered as the third value, after T and F, the fan-like structure has
disappeared. We shall see in a moment that this is significant: for a proper





A ∧ B B
T u F
A T T u F
u u u F
F F F F
A ∨ B B
T u F
A T T T T
u T u u
F T u F
Figure 6. Truth tables of Kleene’s trivalent propositional calculus.
This logic maintains all axioms of classical bivalent logic with the neg-
ation operator ‘∼ ’ for standard ‘¬’, except  A ∨ ∼A. In particular, De
Morgan’s Laws apply unchanged:
(36)a. ∼(A ∧ B) ≡ ∼A ∨ ∼B
b. ∼(A ∨ B) ≡ ∼A ∧ ∼B





A ∧ B B
T F u
A T T F u
F F F F
u u F u
A ∨ B B
T F u
A T T T T
F T F u
u T u u
Figure 7. Truth tables of Kleene’s trivalent propositional calculus.
That the Kleene calculus fails to account for presuppositions appears
from the following. It is assumed, in accordance with all theories of pre-
supposition, that (37) is a defining logical property of the presupposition
relation. (Since Kleene provides no operator yielding truth when v[A] = u
(A is valued u), we introduce the operator ‘u’ and define: v[uA] = T iff
v[A] = u and v[uA] = F otherwise.)
(37) If A P , then A  P and ∼A  P and (∼P ∨ uP )  uA.
Moreover, in any reasonable notion of presupposition, it must be assumed
that:
(38) AC ∧ BD  C ∧D, where A and B are logically independent
(‘XY ’ : ‘X presupposing Y ’).
For neither AC ∧BD nor ∼(AC ∧BD) can be contextually anchored unless
the presuppositions of A and B, i.e., C and D, respectively, are part of the
preceding discourse (see 1.3). This means that AC ∧BD, provided AC and
BD are well-keyed, can only have the values T or F if both C and D are
true. Here, the Kleene calculus poses a problem. Take a situation where C
is true and D is false and AC is false (and, of course, BD has the value u,
since its presupposition D is false). Now C ∧ D has the value F, which
should make it necessary for AC ∧ BD to have the value u. Yet, with F
for AC and u for BD, the Kleene tables give F for AC ∧ BD, and not the
required value u.
The deeper reason why the Kleene calculus fails in this respect becomes
clear in the-space interpretation. Since, in general, ifA  B, then /A/ ⊆
/B/, it follows from (37) that if A  P , then /A/ ⊆ /P/ and /∼A/ ⊆
/P/ and /P/ ⊆ /uA/. In fact, if PA stands for the conjunction of all
presuppositions of A, then /∼A/ ∪ /A/ must equal /PA/. We call /PA/
the PRESUPPOSITIONAL SUBUNIVERSE of A.
If Kleene’s calculus is to account for the presupposition relation, /∼A/
must be defined as /PA/− /A/, as in Figure 8 (left), where /PA/ (the area
within heavy lines) equals /A/ ∪ /∼A/. Figure 8 (right) shows that both











/∼A/ ∪ /A/ = /PA/ /A/ ⊆ /P/ and /∼A/ ⊆ /P/
Figure 8. If A P , then /A/ ⊆ /P/ and /∼A/ ⊆ /P/.
A and ∼A entail their presupposition P (/P/ is represented by the dark
grey area).
However, it is now impossible to set out the -spaces for ∼(A∧B) and
∼(A ∨ B) in such a way that De Morgan’s Laws apply under the Kleene
truth tables. De Morgan’s Laws require that /∼(A ∧ B)/ = /∼A/ ∪
/∼B/ and /∼(A ∨ B)/ = /∼A/ ∩ /∼B/.













































/A ∧ B/ = /A/ ∩ /B/ /A ∧ B/ = /A/ ∩ /B/ /A ∨ B/ = /A/ ∪ /B/
/∼(A ∨ B)/ = /∼A/ ∩ /∼B/
Figure 9.
In Figure 9 we have tried to picture the situation where the requirements
of De Morgan’s Laws are fulfilled, given the definition of presuppositional
∼ as in Figure 8. The conjunction has been represented twice, once with
/PA∧B/ = /PA/ ∪ /PB/ and once with /PA∧B/ = /PA/ ∩ /PB/. In either
case, however it is not so that /∼(A ∧ B)/ = /∼A/ ∪ /∼B/, quite
apart from the fact that the truth tables do not correspond. Moreover, the
diagram for /∼(A ∨ B)/ in Figure 9 (right) violates (37), since nontruth
of PA∨B does not automatically result in the value u for A ∨ B. (The dark
grey areas contain the situations in K that produce T, the light grey areas
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those that produce F, and the white areas those that produce u, for ∼A,
A ∧ B, and A ∨ B, respectively. The areas within heavy lines represent
/PA/, /PA∧B/, and /PA∨B/, respectively.) Therefore, De Morgan’s Laws
cannot be made to hold in the Kleene calculus under a presuppositional
interpretation.
The only way to satisfy Kleene’s calculus in a -space interpreta-
tion is to leave out the notion of presupposition and consider the value
u as a transition between T and F, as in Figure 10. Now De Morgan’s
Laws hold and the right truth tables result, but the presupposition rela-
tion cannot be expressed. The only way to define /PA∧B/ is to take in
Figure 10 (middle) the union of all the non-white areas. Then, however,
/PA/ ∩ /PB/  /PA∧B/, where one would expect these to be equal.
But even if we take this inequality for granted, we still cannot accept
the definition of /PA∧B/, because if A has the value F and B has the
value u, then ∼(A ∧ B) has the value T, whereas the conjunction of the
presuppositions of A and B has the value F, violating (37) and (38). For
that reason we have said, in Section 2.3.1, that the Kleene calculus seems
appropriate as a logical account of a violation of PEM, if the value u is
taken to incorporate all intermediate values between T and F. Note, in-
cidentally, that while in Figure 10 /∼(A ∧ B)/ = /∼A/ ∪ /∼B/ and
/∼(A ∨ B)/ = /∼A/ ∩ /∼B/, the analogous equations with u for ∼




























/∼A/ = /PA/− /A/ /A ∧ B/ = /A/ ∩ /B/ /A ∨ B/ = /A/ ∪ /B/
/∼(A ∧ B)/ = /∼A/ ∪ /∼B/ /∼(A ∨ B)/ = /∼A/ ∩ /∼B/
Figure 10.
2.3.3. The Trivalent Presuppositional Calculus PPC3
In order to satisfy the logical conditions (37) and (38) of the presupposition
relation, it is necessary to define, for AB , where B is the conjunction of all
presuppositions of A, a presuppositional subuniverse or subkey PA such
that /∼A/ = /PA/− /A/ and /PA/ := /B/.
Three values are distinguished: T, F1 and F2, and two complement-
ary negations, the minimal presupposition-preserving negation ∼ and the
radical presupposition-cancelling negation  . (The classical bivalent neg-
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ation ¬ has been thrown in for good measure.) We call /∼A/ the INNER
COMPLEMENT of A, and /A/ the OUTER COMPLEMENT of A.
This gives the truth tables shown in Figure 11. (The implication is left
undefined in PPC3, because conditional sentences in natural language are
clearly not truth-functional but imply a modal notion of necessity which
cannot be expressed by means of a truth table. But if one wishes, an im-
plication of the form A→ B can be defined as ‘(∼A∨A)∨B’, which
reduces this implication to the classical implication. And analogously for
the bi-implication A ≡ B.)
For PPC3 conjunction, F2 takes precedence over the other values and
F1 over T. For disjunction, T takes precedence over the other values and F1
over F2. Note that, for any proposition A, (∼A ∨ A) ≡ ¬A (with the
classical bivalent negation ¬). PPC3 is, therefore, equivalent to classical
bivalent propositional calculus provided only ¬ is used as negation. (In
particular, ¬(A ∧ B) ≡ ¬A ∨ ¬B and ¬(A ∨ B) ≡ ¬A ∧ ¬B.) The
negations ∼ and  are called specific negations, because they turn one
specific kind of falsity into truth. ¬ is a nonspecific negation in PPC3.
A ∼A A ¬A
T F1 F1 F1
F1 T F1 T
F2 F2 T T
A ∧ B B
T F1 F2
A T T F1 F2
F1 F1 F1 F2
F2 F2 F2 F2
A ∨ B B
T F1 F2
A T T T T
F1 T F1 F1
F2 T F1 F2
Figure 11. Truth tables of PPC3.
PPC3 can be extended to PPCn, with n−1 kinds of falsity. Conjunction
always selects the highest degree of falsity and truth only if there is no fals-
ity at all. Disjunction always selects truth over falsity, and lower degrees of
falsity over higher degrees. For each i∼ A (1 ≤ i < n), T and all values Fj
(j < i) are converted to F1, Fi is converted to T, and all values Fk (k > i)
are left unchanged. For PPC4 this is shown in Figure 12. Note that ¬ is
still the disjunction of all specific negations. An interesting corollary is
that a propositional calculus, defined in terms of {¬,∧,∨}, may have any
number of truth values. However, without further specific negations for
specific complements, all distinctions between kinds or degrees of falsity
are vacuous. Economy then requires that all values 
= T be united into one
value for falsity.
In a -space interpretation, PPC3 is represented as in Figure 13. This is
an exact parallel of Figure 10, except that the -spaces of∼A andA (or
uA in Figure 10) have changed positions: in Figure 10, /∼A/ is the outer
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A
1∼ A 2∼ A 3∼ A ¬A
T F1 F1 F1 F1
F1 T F1 F1 T
F2 F2 T F1 T
F3 F3 F3 T T
A ∧ B B
T F1 F2 F3
A T T F1 F2 F3
F1 F1 F1 F2 F3
F2 F2 F2 F2 F3
F3 F3 F3 F3 F3
A ∨ B B
T F1 F2 F3
A T T T T T
F1 T F1 F1 F1
F2 T F1 F2 F2
F3 T F1 F2 F3
Figure 12. Truth tables of PPC4.
complement and /uA/ the inner complement of A, whereas in Figure 13
/∼A/ is the inner complement, and /A/ the outer complement of A.
This means that in PPC3 De Morgan’s Laws hold for the operator  (and,
of course, for ¬), but not for ∼ (unless the value F2 is disregarded).
F2









































/∼A/ = /PA/− /A/ /A ∧ B/ = /A/ ∩ /B/ /A ∨ B/ = /A/ ∪ /B/
Figure 13.
Note that an eternal sentence, and thus without any presuppositions, can
still be regarded, from a strictly logical point of view, as presupposing all
necessary truths. An eternal sentence has no outer complement and cannot
have the value F2. Its inner complement is the classical complement in
K, and standard bivalent logic applies. Thus, a sentence with the internal
structure A∧BA can be read as AK∧BA. Its -space /AK∧BA/ = /BA/,
and /PAK∧BA/ = /PAK/ ∩ /PBA/ = K ∩ /A/ = /A/.
A further important point is the following. In Section 1.3 above, the
logical condition (17) was formulated for the presupposition relation, say-
ing that if A  B, then A |= B and not-A |= B. It was stipulated there
that this condition does not define presupposition but is merely a necessary
condition, since there may be cases where (17) is satisfied but where we
do not want to speak of presupposition. This occurs in particular under the
operator ∧, and specifically with conjunctions of the type A ∧ BA, which
are very frequent in language use, because they are informative in the sense
that /BA/ ⊂ /A/.


















Figure 14. Subsequent processing of A, BA and CBA .
It follows from PPC3 that both A∧BA |= A and ∼(A∧BA) |= A. Yet
we do not want to say that A ∧ BA  A. The reason is that in language a
sequence A and B is processed in any current discourse domain D as the
increment of A followed by the increment of B. A temporal order is thus
involved in the processing of A and B, which cannot be expressed in the
static truth-functional system PPC3. This temporal order is manifest in the
presupposition relation in the manner shown in Figure 14. Let A be a sen-
tence without presuppositions, so that /PA/ = K. The left diagram shows
K after A has been incremented, or added, in K. The middle diagram shows
K after the incrementation of BA, with /PB/ = /A/, and the right diagram
shows the situation after the addition of CBA , now with /PC/ = /B/. That
is, after each successive incrementation the space within which the min-
imal negation operates gets more restricted, and previous presuppositional
subuniverses are cancelled. Since linguistic and is an operator signalling a
new incrementation, the use of a minimal negation over a conjunction of
the type A and BA is logically undefined: in the middle diagram of Figure
14, the minimal negation operates within K for A but within /A/ for BA.
For that reason a structure like∼(A∧BA), though logically sound in PPC3,
has no logically equivalent translation in natural language. A sentence like
(39) He did not marry a princess and divorce her after one year.
does not correspond to the logical structure ∼(A∧BA). In fact, no logical
translation of that sentence is available at present. This being so, we do not
want to say that A and BA presupposes A, whereas we do want to say that
the logically equivalent BA does.
One might consider a system where K and /A/ in the right diagram
of Figure 14 are defined as ‘higher order’ subuniverses delimiting inner
complements under ‘higher order’ negations. In that case the logic would
fluctuate between 2 and n values according to the number n+ 2 of stacked
presuppositions, perhaps as shown for PPCn above. But such a system
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would not model natural language, which does not have a corresponding
system of unlimited ‘higher order’ negations.
So we are faced with a situation where, although /PC/ = /B/, the inner
complement of /B/ is different from the inner complement of /PC/, since
the inner complement of /B/ is delimited with regard to /PB/ = /A/,
while that of /PC/ is delimited with regard to K, without any intervening
presuppositional subuniverse. Phrased in other terms: a presuppositional
proposition has no presuppositions itself. For the extension of the pro-
position PPC , this means that /PPC/ = K, even though /PC/ = /B/
and /PB/ = /A/. The consequences for the calculus of presuppositional
subuniverses are explained in Section 3 below.
2.3.4. Kleene’s Calculus and PPC3 Combined into PPC3-K
PPC3 and the Kleene calculus are compatible and can be combined into
PPC3-K. The Kleenean value ‘u’ between two values x and y is inter-
preted as ‘vague between x and y’. Since PPC3 contains three values, T,
F1 and F2, PPC3-K contains two values u: u1 and u2. The truth tables of
PPC3-K are as in Figure 15. The -space interpretation of PPC3-K is as
in Figure 13 above, but with the boundary lines between /A/ and /∼A/,
and between /∼A/ and /A/ blurred or replaced with a transitional
area. The value u1 stands for the transitional area between /A/ and its
inner complement /∼A/. This value is assigned when A is neither clearly
true nor clearly minimally false. The value u2 stands for the transitional
area between /PA/ and /A/. It is assigned when a presupposition of
A is neither clearly true nor clearly (minimally) false. In either case the
minimal negation ∼ has no effect. The radical negation  , which says
that A suffers from presupposition failure, yields (minimal) falsity when
A is true, minimally false or somewhere in between, and gives minimal







A ∧ B B
T u1 F1 u2 F2
A T T u1 F1 u2 F2
u1 u1 u1 F1 u2 F2
F1 F1 F1 F1 u2 F2
u2 u2 u2 u2 u2 F2
F2 F2 F2 F2 F2 F2
A ∨ B B
T u1 F1 u2 F2
A T T T T T T
u1 T u1 u1 u1 u1
F1 T u1 F1 F1 F1
u2 T u1 F1 u2 u2
F2 T u1 F1 u2 F2
Figure 15. Truth tables of PPC3-K .
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2.3.5. The Relation Between Semantics and Logic
It is probably correct to say that the tables of Figure 15, as far as they go,
do partial justice to the logic of natural language. They certainly provide
an answer to the ancient paradoxes of the Heap ‘Sorites’ and the Horns
(Seuren 1998b, p. 427). Yet standard bivalent logic remains privileged,
in that it is adequate for languages without vague predicates and whose
anchoring and keying conditions are automatically fulfilled so that presup-
positions are either absent or irrelevant. One such language is the language
of mathematics, but many formal or technical uses of natural language
satisfy these conditions as well.
However, whether the tables of Figure 15 also do semantic justice to
natural language as used under normal conditions is another matter. From
a logical point of view, natural language is more complex than standard
bivalent logic, due, in part, to its anchoring and keying conditions. But
besides this greater complexity, which is partly caught in the tables men-
tioned, there is also the fact that logic and semantics are less closely related
than is widely assumed in formal semantics.
Even when a correct and adequate logic of natural language is available,
it does not follow automatically that the logical elements (quantifiers, con-
nectives) as described in the logic of language provide a correct semantic
analysis of their corresponding elements in language. Several aspects play
a central role in semantics but are absent from a logical analysis, which is
concerned solely with the preservation of truth through sets of sentences.
In Seuren (2000) it is argued that speech act quality is an essential aspect
of semantic theory, unjustly assigned to pragmatics in standard formal
semantics. It is argued there that the propositional connectives, including
negation, are more adequately accounted for in terms of different forms of
speaker’s commitment, and not in terms of truth functions.
It is likewise argued there that the logical consequences of the fact
that natural language happily mixes object language and metalanguage,
apparently without the risk of paradoxes, have been unjustly neglected
in standard formal semantics and in the philosophy of language. The
linguistic counterpart of radical negation is richer than its logical represent-
ative , in that it has a specific metalinguistic function (Horn 1985), which
is not captured by its logical definition. This aspect, which is analysed in
detail in Seuren (2000), cannot be further elaborated here.
The logic of natural language, in other words, is considered to be a
metaphysically necessary epiphenomenal aspect of the elements, struc-
tures and processes at issue. Questions of this nature are profound and
far from easy to understand, and it cannot be the purpose of the present
paper to provide a final answer. What we wish to achieve here is, more
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modestly, to bring these questions to the fore and show their importance.
Formal semantics has, on the whole, overlooked or neglected these ques-
tions. They are, however, highly relevant, if only because the machinery
of logic, no matter how enlightening and inspiring from a variety of points
of view, can hardly be considered to provide or constitute a realistic hypo-
thetical reconstruction of the mental structures and processes involved in
the understanding and interpretation of linguistic utterances.
In the following section, the mathematical properties of PPC3 are in-
vestigated, not because PPC3 is regarded as a semantic theory, but rather
because it is essential for any semantic theory that proof be given of the
mathematical soundness of the logic emerging from it.
3. THE BOOLEAN FOUNDATION OF PPC3
3.1. Noncompositionality
The fact that PPC3 is representable by means of a set-theoretic diagram
as in Figure 13 means that it must have a Boolean foundation. Since this
is not provided in the logical or mathematical literature, it is developed
in the present section. It must likewise be possible to develop a Boolean
foundation for the Kleene calculus and for PPC3-K. In order not to com-
plicate matters unduly, this is not attempted here: we shall limit ourselves
to PPC3.
We anticipate immediately that one major problem in the mathematical
theory of presuppositional logic is the noncompositionality of the sys-
tem. By compositionality we mean here the admissibility of substitution
of equal terms inside a context. Let C(a1, . . . , an) be a context in which
the terms a1, . . . , an occur. The substitution property states that we can
substitute equal terms in place of a1, . . . , an, i.e., that if b1 = a1, . . . ,
bn = an, then C(b1, . . . , bn) = C(a1, . . . , an). If the substitution property
holds the equality ‘=’ is said to be a congruence. This property fails for
PPC3 because two -spaces may be equal without having the same inner
complements, as was explained at the end of Section 2.3.3 above. We can
intuitively explain this phenomenon by saying that the equality ‘=’ is blind
to presuppositions and can see only extensions of propositions. This gives
us the idea of defining a new equality ‘≡’ that is able to see presuppositions
as well. That is, a ≡ b means that not only the extensions of a and b are
the same, but also those of their presuppositions. In the next sections we
will formulate and study the system PPC3 with the weak equality ‘=’ and
as from Section 3.5 we will study a compositional version, PPCc3, which
uses the strong equality ‘≡’.
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Consider a Boolean system where a term a stands for the -space of
some sentence A of a language L, i.e., /A/. The principal innovation with
regard to standard Boolean algebra consists in the introduction of an op-
erator ‘1’ such that 1a represents the presuppositional subuniverse /PA/
of A. The symbol ‘1’ is here used as a unary operator that, when applied
to the Boolean term a representing the extension /A/ of a proposition A,
delivers the Boolean term 1a representing /PA/.
The choice of the symbol ‘1’ for the operator at hand has been de-
liberate. It underlines the fact that 1a is interpreted as a presuppositional
subuniverse for the corresponding sentence A. It may look as if the symbol
‘1’ is used ambiguously as (i) a Boolean constant (a constant in all Boolean
systems) and (ii) an operator over terms yielding terms. We can, however,
generalize the notion of 1 as an operator in such a way that the Boolean
constant 1 is seen as a special case of the operator 1. The operator 1 is
thus taken to be basic, the constant 1 being derived from it. We do this by
defining 1 (without argument) as the common value for all 11a for any term
a. Moreover, 11 = 1 (Equation (e21) in Proposition 3.7 below) and 10 = 1
(axiom (D4) in Definition 3.3).
There is a deeper significance to this. The fact that the constant 1 is now
derived from the noncompositional function 1 makes an interpretation of 1
in a system, such as the system of -spaces, less absolute. It is no longer
necessarily the unwieldy ‘universe’ of all that is or may be the case, but
rather a ‘universe’ or key in so far as it is relevant to a given discourse.
It is now also possible to have different ‘universes’ or keys side by side
in a hypersystem of systems running in parallel. It would seem that, in
principle at least, this opens new possibilities for a more adequate logic to
model discourses.
As was shown at the end of Section 2.3.3, the operator 1 is noncompos-
itional, since it is possible for two sentences in natural language to have
identical -spaces yet to differ in their inner complements. That is, we do
not have in general a = b → 1a = 1b. A concrete example will illustrate
this.
Consider the propositions expressed in the following sentences, corres-
ponding exactly to A, B and C, respectively, in Figure 14 above:
(40) A There is an island of Atlantis.
B There are inhabitants on the island of Atlantis.
C The inhabitants of the island of Atlantis have blue eyes.
One might think that, since 1/C/ = /B/ and 1/B/ = /A/, it would follow
that 11/C/ = /A/. This would, however, contradict the fact that presuppos-
itional propositions have no presuppositions themselves (see the remark at
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the end of Section 2.3.3), which is stated formally in axiom (D1) of Defini-
tion 3.3 below: 11/C/ = 1. What we have in fact is 1/C/ = /B/·/A/ = /B/
(C presupposes both that there is an island of Atlantis and that it is in-
habited, i.e., that the island of Atlantis is inhabited). But our troubles
are not over yet: it would follow from 1/B/ = /A/ and 1/A/ = 1 that
1/B/ · 1/A/ = /A/, which would lead to the contradiction
1 = 11/C/ = 1/B/·/A/ = 1/B/ · 1/A/ = /A/.
The mistake in this fallacious argument lies in the fact that = is not a
congruence relation. Therefore we cannot replace 1/C/ with /A/ · /B/
inside a context (especially under the 1 operator). A counterexample in
the formal system PPC3 is the equality between 1a and a + a˜. (In PPC3,
a˜ is the minimal negation of a.) These two terms, although equal, cannot
be substituted for each other in a context. See Section 3.4 for a formal
treatment.
3.2. The System PPC3
We now define the formal system of presupposition logic PPC3. It is an
extension of ordinary classical (Boolean) proposition logic with presup-
positions and two negations. The propositions are built up from literals,
Lit, using the binary connectives · and +, the unary connectives 1, −˜ and
−̂ and the constants 0 and 1. The intended meaning of these connectives is
this:
1a the conjoined presuppositions of the sentence a
a˜ the minimal negation of a (negating a, affirming the presuppositions)
â the radical negation of a (negating the presuppositions)
We use − (complement) and − (minus) as abbreviations for the composite
connectives a := a˜ + â and a − b := a · b. The intended meaning of
a is the ordinary Boolean negation, the complement of a. When writing
propositions, we remove brackets by letting · bind more strongly than +.
We give the precise mathematical definition of the language of PPC3.
Definition 3.1 says that the terms of PPC3, forming the set T , are construc-
ted starting from the literals, elements of Lit, and the constants 0 and 1, and
recursively applying the operators +, ·, _̂, _˜ and 1.
DEFINITION 3.1. The set of terms of PPC3, T , is defined recursively as
follows.
T ::= Lit | T + T | T · T | 0 | 1 | T̂ | T˜ | 1T .
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REMARKS 3.2.
1. The connective − is not taken as a primitive, but is ‘decomposed’ in
terms of other (new) connectives. This means that we have to prove
that we indeed have a Boolean algebra.
2. In Boolean algebra, we can take different sets of connectives as basic
(and then define the others in terms of the basic ones). The reason this
can be done is that Boolean equality is a congruence with respect to the
connectives. In PPC3, equality is not a congruence, hence the choice
of primitives is crucial. For example, if we define a := a˜ + â, as we
have done above, we can freely substitute a˜ + â for a, which is not
allowed if a = a˜ + â is a derived equality. We have already pointed
out this problem in Section 3.1. A formal analysis is given in Section
3.4.
The Boolean connectives enjoy the well-known Boolean equations.
That is, they form a distributive lattice. We recapitulate the axioms of a
distributive lattice.
a + b = b + a a · b = b · a
(a + b)+ c = a + (b + c) (a · b) · c = a · (b · c)
(a + b) · c = a · c + b · c
a + a = a a · a = a
a + 1 = 1 a · 1 = a
a + 0 = a a · 0 = 0
It is well-known that the following equations are now derivable: a ·b+b =
b, (a+b)·b = b, a·b+c = (a+c)·(b+c) and a+b = 0 → a = 0 & b = 0,
a · b = 1 → a = 1 & b = 1.
A property which is usually left implicit in the definition of distributive
lattice is that = is a congruence for the connectives · and +. As ‘=’ is not
a congruence for the other connectives, we need to require this property
explicitly by adding the axioms:
a = b and c = d → a + c = b + d
a = b and c = d → a · c = b · d.
DEFINITION 3.3. PPC3 is the formal system for deriving equations
from
1. the axioms for a distributive lattice (including the congruence axioms
for · and +, see above),
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2. the following 10 special axioms
(A1) a + a˜ = 1a (D1) 11a = 1
(A2) a · a˜ = 0 (D2) 1a˜ = 1a
(B1) â + 1a = 1 (D3) 1â = 1
(B2) â · 1a = 0 (D4) 10 = 1.
(C1) 1a·b = 1a · 1b
(C2) 1a+b = 1a + 1b
To denote that, for a, b ∈ T , a = b is derivable in PPC3, we shall write
PPC3  a = b
Axioms A1 and A2 state that 1a is the union of a and a˜ and that a and
a˜ are disjoint. So, a and a˜ are each other’s complement within 1a . Axiom
B1 and B2 say something similar about â and 1a: they are disjoint and
their union is 1. This amounts to the first picture in Figure 13, describing
a ⊆ 1a ⊆ 1, a˜ ⊆ 1a and â ⊆ 1 with a, a˜ disjoint and 1a, â disjoint.
Axioms C1 and C2 specify that the 1 operator commutes with · and +.
The D-axioms describe how connectives (especially 1, −˜ and −̂) operate
under the 1 connective.
LEMMA 3.4. Given a proposition a, a is the unique proposition for which
the Boolean laws for complement hold: a · a = 0 and a + a = 1.
Proof We have to show two things:
1. The defined connective − satisfies the axioms of Boolean logic.
2. If a · b = 0 and a + b = 1, then b = a (i.e., a is unique).
The proof of the first is as follows.
a + a = a + a˜ + â = 1a + â = 1.
a · a = a · (˜a + â) = a · a˜ + a · â = a · â
= a · â + 0 = a · â + 1a · â = (a + 1a) · â
= (a + a + a˜) · â = 1a · â = 0.
The second is shown as follows. Suppose a · b = 0 and a + b = 1. Then
a = a · 1 = a · (a + b) = a · a + a · b = a · b
= a · b + a · b = (a + a) · b = b.
THEOREM 3.5. PPC3 is an extension of Boolean logic.
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Proof The only thing left to prove is that the equality = is a congruence
with respect to the defined connective −, i.e., if a = b, then a = b. So,
suppose a = b. Then a · a = 0 and a + a = 1. But, due to the fact that =
is a congruence for · and +, we also have b · a = 0 and b + a = 1. As b
satisfies these same equations, we conclude that a = b (by the uniqueness
stated in the previous Lemma).
REMARK 3.6. As PPC3 satisfies the Boolean axioms, we can freely use
notions from Boolean logic. In the following, we use the abbreviations
a ≤ b (and a ≥ b for b ≤ a):
a ≤ b abbreviates a · b = a
or, equivalently, a + b = b.
PROPOSITION 3.7. The following equations are derivable in PPC3.
(e1) 1a + a = 1a (e3) â · a = 0
(e2) 1a · a = a (e4) a˜ · â = 0
(e5) a˜ = 1a − a (e11) â = 1˜a = 1a
(e6) ˜̂a = 1a (e12) ̂˜a = â
(e7) a˜ = a (e13) â = 0
(e8) a˜ + a = a (e14) â + a = a
(e9) a˜ · a = a˜ (e15) â · a = â
(e10) 1˜a = 1a (e16) 1̂a = 0
(e17) a˜ + b = a˜ · b˜ + a˜ · b̂ + â · b˜ (e19) â + b = â · b̂ = 1a+b
(e18) a˜ · b = a˜ · b˜ + a˜ · b + b˜ · a (e20) â · b = â + b̂ = 1a·b
(e21) 11 = 1
(e22) 1˜ = 0 (e25) 0˜ = 1
(e23) 1̂ = 0 (e26) 0̂ = 0
(e24) 1 = 0 (e27) 0 = 1
Proof
(e1) 1a + a A1= a + a˜ + a = a˜ + a = 1a
(e2) 1a · a A1= (a + a˜) · a = a + 0 = a
(e3, e4) 0 B2= 1a · â A1= (a+ a˜) · â = a · â+ a˜ · â. Hence a · â = a˜ · â = 0.
574 PIETER A. M. SEUREN ET AL.
(e5) 1a − a = 1a · (˜a + â) = 1a · a˜ + 1a · â B2= 1a · a˜ A1= (a+ a˜) · a˜ A2=
0 + a˜ = a˜
(e10) 1˜a
e5= 11a − 1a = 1− 1a = 1a
(e11) Both â and 1˜a are the complement of 1a(and hence â = 1˜a) :
â · 1a B2= 0 and â + 1a B1= 1
1˜a · 1a A2= 0 and 1˜a + 1a A1= 11a D1= 1
(e12) ̂˜a e11= 1a˜ D2= 1a e11= â
(e6) ˜̂a e5= 1â − â D3= 1 − â = â e11= 1a = 1a
(e7) a˜ = a˜ · 1 = a˜ · (a + a) = a˜ · a + a˜ · a˜ + a˜ · â A2=
a˜ · a + 0 + a˜ · â e12= a˜ · a + a˜ · ̂˜a e4= a˜ · a + 0 = a˜ · a + a · a =
(˜a + a˜ + â) · a A1= (1a˜ + â) · a D2= (1a + â) · a B1= 1 · a = a
(e8) a˜ + a = a˜ + a˜ + â = a˜ + â = a
(e9) a˜ · a = a˜ · (˜a + â) = a˜ + a˜ · â = a˜ · (1 + â) = a˜
(e13) â e11= 1â D3= 1 = 0
(e14) â + a = â + a˜ + â = a˜ + â = a
(e15) â · a = â · (˜a + â) = â + a˜ · â = â · (1 + a˜) = â
(e16) 1̂a
e11= 11a D1= 1 = 0
(e17) a˜ + b e5= 1a+b − (a + b) C2= (1a + 1b)− (a + b) = ((1a − a)−
b)+ ((1b − a)− b)) A1=
(a + a˜) · (˜a + â) · (˜b + b̂)+ (b + b˜) · (˜a + â) · (˜b + b̂) A2,e3,e4=
a˜ · b˜ + a˜ · b̂ + â · b˜
(e18) a˜ · b e5= 1a·b− (a · b) C1= (1a · 1b)− (a · b) = (1a · 1b) · (a+ b) =
(1a · a · 1b)+ (1b · b · 1a) e5=
(˜a ·1b)+ (˜b ·1a) A1= (˜a ·(b+ b˜))+ (˜b ·(a+ a˜)) = a˜ · b˜+ a˜ ·b+ b˜ ·a
(e19) â + b e11= 1a+b C2= 1a + 1b = 1a · 1b e11= â · b̂
(e20) â · b e11= 1a·b C1= 1a · 1b = 1a + 1b e11= â + b̂.
(e21) 11
A1= 1 + 1˜ = 1
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(e22) 1˜ = 1˜ · 1 A2= 0
(e23) 1̂ = 1̂ · 1 e21= 1̂ · 11 B2= 0
(e24) 1 = 1˜ + 1̂ = 0+ 0 = 0
(e25) 0˜ = 0˜ + 0 A1= 10 D4= 1
(e26) 0̂ e11= 10 D4= 1 e24= 0
(e27) 0 = 0˜ + 0̂ = 1+ 0 = 1.
The axioms for PPC3 given above are still redundant as the connective
−̂ is definable in terms of 1 and _˜.
LEMMA 3.8. In PPC3, â is definable: â := 1˜a.
Proof We have to show that, if we remove the connective −̂ and the cor-
responding axioms, and we define â as above, then all the laws of PPC3
hold for this defined connective. The only axioms in which −̂ occurs are
B1, B2 and D3.
(B1) â + 1a = 1˜a + 1a A1= 11a D1= 1.
(B2) â · 1a = 1˜a · 1a A2= 0.
(D3) 1â = 11˜a D2= 11a D1= 1.
So a minimal calculus for PPC3 would consist of terms (propositions)
built up from literals, Lit, using the binary connectives · and +, the unary
connectives 1 and −˜ and the constants 0 and 1, satisfying the axioms for a
distributive lattice (including congruence axioms for · and +), in addition
satisfying the axioms (A1), (A2), (C1), (C2), (D1), (D2) and (D4).
3.3. Consistency and Models
We can prove consistency of PPC3 by showing that standard Boolean
algebra is a special case of it in which we take 1a := 1, â := 0 and
a˜ := a for every term a. Since Boolean algebra is consistent, PPC3 must
be too. This also implies that the axiom 1a = 1 is a consistent extension
of PPC3, yielding the maximal interpretation for 1. The parallel minimal
interpretation 1a := a is not sound, since it conflicts with axiom D1:
a = 1a = 11a = 1, so all propositions would be equal to 1. This shows
that no proposition except for the necessarily true ones presupposes itself.
We now define the semantics of PPC3, inspired by the notions presented
in Section 2.3.3 and visually displayed in Figure 13. We saw there that to
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every proposition we can associate two subsets of possible situations, the
subset of situations in which the presuppositions are fulfilled, and which
we called the subkey of the proposition, and the subset of situations in
which the proposition proper is fulfilled. Similarly, we now define two
semantic objects associated with a term a of PPC3, the interpretation of
its presupposition, [[1a]], and the interpretation of a proper, [[a]]. We take a
more abstract viewpoint than in Section 2.3.3, taking as model for the in-
terpretation a general Boolean algebra B = 〈B; #,unionsq,⊥,&,−〉. Intuitively,
think of B as the family of all sets of possible situations, i.e., the powerset
of K, of ⊥ as the empty set ∅, of & as the set K of all situations and of #,
unionsq and − as the operations of intersection, union and complementation for
sets. We use the relation (, which is defined by: p ( q if p # q = p or,
equivalently, punionsqq = q. In the case of a set model, ( is the subset relation.
We also write p ) q for q ( p.
We define a general notion of PPC3 model. The idea is that to every pro-
position a we associate two objects, one giving the interpretation of a itself
(its Boolean value) and one giving the interpretation of the presuppositions
of a (the value of 1a). An atomic proposition α (a literal) therefore has two
basic values, ρ(α) and ξ(α), representing these two interpretations. These
basic values are given by two assignments ρ ad ξ , which are parameters
of the model. An assignment is a map ρ : Lit → B, from the literals to a
Boolean algebra B.
DEFINITION 3.9. A PPC3-model is a tern (B, ρ, ξ), with B a Boolean
algebra and ρ and ξ two assignments such that ρ ( ξ , i.e., ρ(α) ( ξ(α)
for every literal α ∈ Lit.
DEFINITION 3.10. Given a PPC3-model (B, ρ, ξ), the interpretation
function [[−]]ρξ (taking a PPC3 term and returning an element of B) is
defined as follows.
[[0]]ρξ = ⊥, [[10]]ρξ = &,
[[1]]ρξ = &, [[11]]ρξ = &,
[[α]]ρξ = ρ(α), [[1α]]ρξ = ξ(α),
[[a · b]]ρξ = [[a]]ρξ # [[b]]ρξ , [[1a·b]]ρξ = [[1a]]ρξ # [[1b]]ρξ ,
[[a + b]]ρξ = [[a]]ρξ unionsq [[b]]ρξ , [[1a+b]]ρξ = [[1a]]ρξ unionsq [[1b]]ρξ ,
[[˜a]]ρξ = [[1a]]ρξ − [[a]]ρξ , [[1a˜]]ρξ = [[1a]]ρξ ,
[[̂a]]ρξ = [[1a]]ρξ , [[1â]]ρξ = &,
[[11a ]]ρξ = &.
REMARK 3.11. Note that the interpretation function [[−]] is well-defined,
but not by induction on the length of a proposition, but by induction on the
measure m, defined as follows. m(α) = 1, m(a + b) = m(a) + m(b),
m(a · b) = m(a)+m(b), m(1a) = 1+m(a), m(˜a) = m(̂a) = 2+m(a).
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The property that the interpretation of a proposition is always contained
in the interpretation of its presuppositions is expressed by the following
lemma.
LEMMA 3.12. In a PPC3-model we have
[[1a]]ρξ ) [[a]]ρξ .
Proof Remembering that in a Boolean algebra b1 ) b2 is defined as b1 #
b2 = b2 or, equivalently, as b1 unionsq b2 = b1, we prove the claim by induction
on the structure of a.
α [[1α]]ρξ # [[α]]ρξ = ξ(α) # ρ(α) = ρ(α)
(because ρ ( ξ)
a˜ [[1a˜]]ρξ # [[˜a]]ρξ = [[1a]]ρξ # [[1a]]ρξ # [[a]]ρξ
= [[1a]]ρξ # [[a]]ρξ = [[˜a]]ρξ
â [[1â]]ρξ # [[̂a]]ρξ = & # [[̂a]]ρξ = [[̂a]]ρξ
1a [[11a ]]ρξ # [[1a]]ρξ = & # [[1a]]ρξ = [[1a]]ρξ
a · b [[1a·b]]ρξ # [[a · b]]ρξ = [[1a]]ρξ # [[a]]ρξ # [[1b]]ρξ # [[b]]ρξ
IH= [[a]]ρξ # [[b]]ρξ = [[a · b]]ρξ
a + b [[1a+b]]ρξ unionsq [[a + b]]ρξ = [[1a]]ρξ unionsq [[a]]ρξ unionsq [[1b]]ρξ unionsq [[b]]ρξ
IH= [[1a]]ρξ unionsq [[1b]]ρξ = [[1a+b]]ρξ
where IH= denotes an application of the induction hypothesis, stating that
the thesis already holds for a and b. Note that only in the last case do we
use (for convenience) b1 unionsq b2 = b1 as a formulation for b1 ) b2.
The two main properties that we expect from a semantics are validity
and completeness. Validity states that every equality a = b that can be
proved in the system is valid, i.e., the interpretations of the two terms,
[[a]]ρξ and [[b]]ρξ , are the same in every model. This guarantees that what
we derive formally is true. Completeness states that if two terms a and b
are interpreted in equal objects in every model, then it must be possible to
prove that they are equal, i.e., PPC3  a = b is derivable. This guaran-
tees that our formal system completely captures all the properties of the
semantics.
THEOREM 3.13. [Validity] The model notion of Definition 3.9 is sound,
i.e., if PPC3  a = b, then [[a]]ρξ = [[b]]ρξ in all PPC3-models (B, ρ, ξ).
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Proof We have to check that the axioms for a distributive lattice and the
10 axioms of Definition 3.3 hold in the model.
The axioms for a distributive lattice are trivially proved from the fact
that B is a distributive lattice.
That axioms (C1), (C2), (D1)–(D4) hold in the model follows imme-
diately from the definition of the interpretation (3.10). Rules (A1)–(B2)
require slightly more work. We show (A2), (B1) and (B2) in detail and
then we discuss (A1).
(A2) [[a · a˜]]ρξ = [[a]]ρξ # ([[1a]]ρξ − [[a]]ρξ )
= [[a]]ρξ # [[1a]]ρξ # [[a]]ρξ = ⊥
(B1) [[̂a + 1a]]ρξ = [[1a]]ρξ unionsq [[1a]]ρξ = &
(B2) [[̂a · 1a]]ρξ = [[1a]]ρξ # [[1a]]ρξ = ⊥
To prove that (A1) holds, we first recall that [[1a]]ρξ ) [[a]]ρξ for every a,
or equivalently, that [[1a]]ρξ # [[a]]ρξ = [[a]]ρξ for every a. This was proved
in Lemma 3.12. Given this result, we prove (A1) as follows.
(A1) [[a + a˜]]ρξ = [[a]]ρξ unionsq ([[1a]]ρξ # [[a]]ρξ )
= ([[1a]]ρξ # [[a]]ρξ ) unionsq ([[1a]]ρξ # [[a]]ρξ ) =
[[1a]]ρξ # ([[a]]ρξ unionsq [[a]]ρξ ) = [[1a]]ρξ
To prove completeness we define the PPC3-term-model. This is a PPC3-
model consisting of the terms of PPC3 (given by the set T , see Definition
3.1) itself. This means that we have to cast T into a Boolean algebra and
define ρ and ξ as required by Definition 3.9.
DEFINITION 3.14. The setB is defined by quotienting T with the PPC3-
equality. In other words, the elements of B are the equivalence classes [t]
(for t ∈ T ), where
[t] := {t ′ ∈ T |PPC3  t = t ′}.
The Boolean operations are defined as the corresponding operators of
PPC3 applied inside the equivalence classes:
⊥ := [0], & := [1],
[a] # [b] := [a · b], [a] unionsq [b] := [a + b],
[a] := [a] = [̂a + a˜].
It can be proved that these operations are well-defined and they determine
a Boolean algebra.
The PPC3-term-model is now obtained by taking (B, ρ, ξ) with
ρ(α) = [α] and ξ(α) = [1α] for α ∈ Lit.
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LEMMA 3.15.
1. The PPC3-term-model ((B, ρ, ξ) in the previous Definition) is indeed
a PPC3-model.
2. For all a, b ∈ T , if [[a]]ρξ = [[b]]ρξ in the PPC3-term-model (B, ρ, ξ),
then PPC3  a = b.
Proof 1. It has to be shown that B is a Boolean algebra and that ρ ( ξ .
The first follows from Theorem 3.5. The second follows from the fact
that 1a · a = a is a derived rule in PPC3 (rule (e2) in Proposition 3.7).
2. This follows immediately from the fact that
[[a]]ρξ = [a]
for all a ∈ T , which can be shown by an easy induction on the structure
of a.
THEOREM 3.16 (Completeness). The model notion of Definition 3.9 is
complete, i.e., if [[a]]ρξ = [[b]]ρξ holds in all PPC3-models (B, ρ, ξ), then
PPC3  a = b.
Proof Suppose a and b are two PPC3-terms such that
[[a]]ρξ = [[b]]ρξ
holds in all PPC3-models. Then [[a]]ρξ = [[b]]ρξ holds in the PPC3-term-
model (B, ρ, ξ) and hence PPC3  a = b, due to Lemma 3.15.
Corresponding to the maximal interpretation of PPC3, we have trivial
models in which ξ(α) = & for every α ∈ Lit. We can construct simple
nontrivial models by choosing any boolean algebra B and any function
ρ that is not constantly & and letting ξ(α) = ρ(α) for every α ∈ Lit.
In this model we have that for a literal α such that ρ(α) 
= &, also
[[1α]]ρξ = ξ(α) 
= & = [[1]]ρξ and so the model is nontrivial (the inter-
pretation of 1A is not just always &). Observe that this model does not
correspond to the unsound minimal interpretation, because the identifica-
tion of the presupposition of a term with the term itself is stipulated only
for the literals and not for every term. Notably, for a term 1α (α a literal),
the presupposition of 1α is not identified with 1α in the model. (Proof:
we have seen that [[1α]]ρξ 
= &. It is also the case that [[11α ]]ρξ = &, so
[[1α]]ρξ 
= [[11α ]]ρξ : the terms 1α and 11α are not identified in this model.)
It also follows from validity that 1α = 1 is not derivable in PPC3. As a
consequence, the term model is also nontrivial. Indeed, for a literal α, we
have that [[1α]]ρξ 
= [[1]]ρξ , because the equality 1α = 1 is not derivable in
PPC3. As a conclusion of this paragraph we state the following fact.
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FACT 3.17. There are non-trivial models of PPC3, that is, models in
which [[1a]]ρξ 
= [[1]]ρξ for some term a.
3.4. Compositionality in the Calculus and the Models
In Section 3.1 the noncompositionality of the calculus has already been
discussed when we looked at the example sentences (40). It has been ar-
gued that the equality of PPC3 is not a congruence. A counterexample to
congruence in the formal system PPC3 is given by the terms a + a˜ and
1a , which are equal but cannot be substituted for each other in a context.
According to axiom (A1), 1a = a + a˜. If the calculus were compositional,
we could substitute one of the two terms for the other when they appear as
arguments of the 1 operator, yielding 11a = 1a+a˜ . But this equality is not
always valid. In fact, the left hand side is equal to the unity, 11a = 1 by
(D1), whereas the right hand side can be proved to be equal to the presup-
position of a, 1a+a˜ = 1a + 1a˜ = 1a + 1a = 1a . Unless the presupposition
of a is trivially equal to unity, the supposed equality cannot hold. This
clearly shows that in PPC3 equality is not a congruence with respect to the
1 operator.
Similarly, equality is not a congruence with respect the operators −˜ and
−̂. A counterexample is again given by the term a + a˜: 1a = a + a˜, but
1˜a = a˜ + a˜ is not generally true, because a˜ + a˜ = a˜ · a˜ + a˜ · ̂˜a + â · a˜ =
0+ a˜ · â + â · a = 0+ 0 = 0 (using e17, e12 and e7) and 1˜a = â. Finally
1a = a+a˜, but 1̂a = â + a˜ is not true in general, because â + a˜ = â ·̂˜a = â
(using e19 and e12) and 1̂a = 0.
In a model, the fact that equality is a congruence with respect to the op-
erators is called compositionality: the interpretation of a formula is defined
by structural recursion. For the 1 operator, this would mean that [1a] is
defined as U([a]), with U the function that represents the 1 operator in
the model. In a non-trivial model, we cannot have such an operator U .
Or, stated differently, the operator U in the model (that represents the
connective 1) cannot be a function.
DEFINITION 3.18. We call compositionality the rule
a = b→ 1a = 1b.
FACT 3.19. Compositionality is equivalent to the rule 1a = 1.
Proof Assume compositionality. Then 1a = 1a˜ = 11a ·a = 11a · 1a =
1 · 1a˜+â = 1a˜ + 1â = 1a + 1 = 1. Proving compositionality from 1a = 1
is easy.
THE LOGIC AND MATHEMATICS OF OCCASION SENTENCES 581
So, compositionality yields a trivial model. We have a way of con-
structing non-trivial models: If we take ξ(α) 
= &, then [[1α]]ρξ 
= &.
In such a model compositionality does not hold: 1α and α + α˜ are equal
in a non-trivial model, but 11α and 1α+α˜ are not: [[11α ]]ρξ = &, whereas
[[1α+α˜]]ρξ = ξ(α).
REMARKS 3.20.
1. If we let ξ(α) = & for all literals, we have a trivial model (i.e.,
[[1a]]ρξ = & for all a).
2. There can be no model in which [[a]]ρξ = [[1a]]ρξ for all a. Suppose
that [[a]]ρξ = [[1a]]ρξ for all a. Then [[a]]ρξ = [[1a]]ρξ = [[11a ]]ρξ = &
for all a. This is a contradiction because at least 0 is not interpreted as
&.
3.5. A Compositional Equality in PPC3
We have already observed that in PPC3 there is only one ‘level’ of pre-
suppositions: if a is a sentence, then 1a , the sentence that expresses the
presuppositions of a, is, in general, a sentence different from 1. But 11a ,
the sentence expressing the presuppositions of 1a (the presuppositions of
the presuppositions of a) is always 1. So, two sentences a and b can be
distinct in their ‘classical’ Boolean interpretation (then a 
= b) or they can
be distinct in their presuppositions (then (1a 
= 1b), but in no other way:
we always have 11a = 11b . This fact can also be observed in a different
way. We first define the strong equality a ≡ b.
DEFINITION 3.21. The strong equality a ≡ b in PPC3 is defined as
follows.
a ≡ b if and only if a = b and 1a = 1b in PPC3.
LEMMA 3.22. Strong equality is a congruence for all connectives. That
is
a ≡ b & c ≡ d → a + c ≡ b + d(1)
a ≡ b & c ≡ d → a · c ≡ b · d(2)
a ≡ b → 1a ≡ 1b(3)
a ≡ b → a˜ ≡ b˜(4)
a ≡ b → â ≡ b̂(5)
a ≡ b → a ≡ b.(6)
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Proof Suppose a ≡ b and c ≡ d. Then a = b, 1a = 1b, c = d and
1c = 1d . Hence a + c = b + d, because = is a congruence for +. We also
find
1a+c
C1= 1a + 1c = 1b + 1d C1= 1b+d ,
and so a+ c ≡ b+ d. The argument for · is analogous. Therefore we have
proved (1) and (2).
Suppose a ≡ b. Then a = b and 1a = 1b. As 11a = 11b by rule (D1), we
find that 1a ≡ 1b, which proves (3).
Suppose a ≡ b. Then a = b and 1a = 1b. Now, a˜ e5= 1a · a = 1b · b e5= b˜.
Also 1a˜
D2= 1a = 1b D2= 1b˜, which proves (4).
Suppose a ≡ b. Then a = b and 1a = 1b. Now, â e11= 1a = 1b e11= b̂. Also
1â
D3= 1 D3= 1b̂, thus proving (5).
Suppose a ≡ b. Then a = b and 1a = 1b. Using (4) and (5) we find
that a = â + a˜ = b̂ + b˜ = b. Using (3), (4) and (5), we also derive that
1a = 1a˜+â C2= 1a˜ + 1â = 1b˜ + 1b̂ C2= 1b˜+b̂ = 1b, thus proving (6).
3.6. A Compositional Presentation of PPC3
Building on the previous section, we give a completely compositional
presentation of PPC3. That is, we characterize the compositional equality
≡ independently. Moreover, we define the (noncompositional) equality of
PPC3 in terms of this ≡. We call our new system PPCc3, compositional
PPC3.
There are two reasons for studying this new system. First, our aim in
developing a formal system for presuppositional sentences is to capture
the logic and semantics of presuppositions. The meaning of a proposition
contains the meaning of its presuppositions. It is natural to say that two
propositions are equal when they have the same meaning. Since there is no
precise mathematical theory of meaning, this cannot be done in a Boolean
setting, in which the equality “=” is taken to be identity of extensions.
Much of the meaning of a proposition is lost in this interpretation. We
have made an effort to produce a mathematical theory that captures a little
more of the meaning of sentences. We are now in the position to give an
interpretation of propositions which is more faithful to what really happens
in natural language. Hence, we consider two propositions to be equal when
not just their extensions, but also the extensions of their presuppositions
coincide.
Second, a compositional theory has nicer mathematical properties that
facilitate its study. PPCc3 is a standard equational theory, that can be studied
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using classical methods from Universal Algebra. Once the equivalence of
PPC3 and PPCc3 is established, it is easier, when trying to prove something
in PPC3, to translate the problem into the system PPCc3 and solve it there.
DEFINITION 3.23. The language of PPCc3 is almost the same as that of
PPC3. There are two additions. The first is the constant +, which indic-
ates a proposition that presupposes a necessary falsity. The second is a
new unary operation  that takes a proposition as argument and yields a
necessarily false proposition having the argument as presupposition.
The set of terms of PPCc3, T c, is defined recursively as follows.
T c ::= Lit | T c + T c | T c · T c | + | 1 | T˜ c | 1T c |T c .
DEFINITION 3.24. The axioms of PPCc3 are the following.
1. The equality ≡ is a congruence relation, i.e., is an equivalence relation
and is preserved under application of the operations: if a1 ≡ a2 and
b1 ≡ b2 then a1 + b1 ≡ a2 + b2, a1 · b1 ≡ a2 · b2, a˜1 ≡ a˜2, 1a1 ≡ 1a2
and a1 ≡ a2 .
2. The operators + and · and the constants + and 1 determine a dis-
tributive lattice with a bottom and a top element. This means that the
following equations hold.
a + b ≡ b + a a · b ≡ b · a
a + (b + c) ≡ (a + b)+ c a · (b · c) ≡ (a · b) · c
(a · b)+ b ≡ b (a + b) · b ≡ b
(a + b) · c ≡ a · c + b · c (a · b)+ c ≡ (a + c) · (b + c)
a + a ≡ a a · a ≡ a
a + 1 ≡ 1 a · + ≡ +
a ++ ≡ a a · 1 ≡ a
3. Specific axioms for PPCc3 that determine the properties of the unary
operators −˜, 1 and .
(Ac1) 1˜+ ≡ 1 (Ac7) 11a ≡ 1
(Ac2) a˜ ≡ a (Ac8) 1a˜ ≡ 1a
(Ac3) a · a˜ ≡ a · 1+ (Ac9) 1a · a ≡ a
(Ac4) a + a˜ + 1+ ≡ 1a (Ac10) 1+ + 1˜a ≡ 1˜a
(Ac5) 1a·b ≡ 1a · 1b (Ac11) 1a ≡ a + 1+
(Ac6) 1a+b ≡ 1a + 1b (Ac12) a ≡ ˜1a · 1a
NOTE 3.25. The symbol + is not the usual zero, it does not correspond
to 0 in the original presentation of PPC3. It is rather an absolute zero
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corresponding to propositions that presuppose a necessary falsity, like for
example
John knows that bachelors are married.
The operator , when applied to a proposition a, gives a proposition
a which is necessarily false and has a as presupposition. An example of
such a construction in language could be
Some living dead know that a.
NOTE 3.26. We do not require that our structure is a Boolean algebra.
Indeed the negation operation −˜ does not behave like the ordinary com-
plement in Boolean algebras. Specifically the equation a · a˜ ≡ + is not
satisfied.
We want to prove that this theory is equivalent to the original one. We




a := â + a˜
a − b := a · b
and the (weak) equality
a = b def⇐⇒ a + 0 ≡ b + 0.
Now we have to prove that with these definitions ·, +, 0, 1, − and =
form a Boolean algebra and that the axioms of 3.3 are satisfied.
LEMMA 3.28. ·, + and = form a distributive lattice.
Proof It is enough to sum 0 to both sides of the corresponding equations
that express the fact that ·, + and ≡ form a distributive lattice. Of the two
axioms involving 0, the first, a + 0 = a, translates to a + 1+ + 1+ ≡ 1+,
which is trivially true. The second, a · 0 = 0 translates to a · 1+ + 1+ ≡ 1+
and is proved by the following argument:
a · 1+ + 1+ ≡ a · 1+ + 1 · 1+ ≡ (a + 1) · 1+ ≡ 1 · 1+ ≡ 1+.
LEMMA 3.29. a · a = 0
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Proof If we unfold the definitions we have to prove that a ·(1˜a+ a˜)+1+ ≡
1+.
a · (1˜a + a˜)+ 1+ ≡ a · 1˜a + a · a˜ + 1+
Ac3≡ a · 1˜a + a · 1+ + 1+
≡ a · (1˜a + 1+)+ 1+
Ac10≡ a · 1˜a + 1+
Ac9≡ a · 1a · 1˜a + 1+
Ac3≡ a · 1a · 1+ + 1+
Ac9≡ a · 1+ + 1+ ≡ (a + 1) · 1+
≡ 1 · 1+ ≡ 1+.
LEMMA 3.30. a + a = 1.
Proof Unfolding the definitions, we have to prove that a+1˜a+a˜+1+ ≡ 1.
a + 1˜a + a˜ + 1+ ≡ a + a˜ + 1+ + 1˜a + 1+
Ac4≡ 1a + 1˜a + 1+
Ac4≡ 11a
Ac7≡ 1.
We have thus proved that
THEOREM 3.31. ·, +, 1, 0, − and = determine a Boolean algebra.
We prove the specific equalities of PPC3.
PROPOSITION 3.32. The axioms A1–D4 of PPC3 are satisfied in PPCc3.
Proof A1 a + a˜ = 1a . Immediate from Ac4.
A2 a · a˜ = 0. We have to prove that a · a˜+0 ≡ 0+0, i.e., a · a˜+0 ≡ 0.
a · a˜ + 0 A
c
3≡ a · 1+ + 0 ≡ a · 0 + 0 ≡ (a + 1) · 0 ≡ 1 · 0 = 0.
B1 â + 1a = 1. Unfolding some of the definitions we have to prove
that 1˜a + 1a + 1+ ≡ 1 + 0. Now 1˜a + 1a + 0
Ac4≡ 11a
Ac7≡ 1 = 1 + 0.
B2 â ·1a = 0. Unfolding some of the definitions we have to prove that
1˜a · 1a + 0 ≡ 1+ 0. Now 1˜a · 1a
Ac3≡ 1a · 1+
Ac5≡ 1a·+ ≡ 1+ ≡ 0, proving
the claim.
C1 1a·b = 1a · 1b. Immediate from Ac5.
C2 1a+b = 1a + 1b. Immediate from Ac6.
D1 11a = 1. Immediate from Ac7.
D2 1a = 1a˜ . Immediate from Ac8.
D3 1â = 1. Unfolding the definitions we have to prove that 11˜a + 0 ≡
1 + 0. Now the claim follows from 11˜a
Ac8≡ 11a
Ac7≡ 1.
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D4 10 = 1. Unfolding the definitions we have to prove that 11+ + 0 ≡
1 + 0. This follows immediately from (Ac7).
So the axioms of the original PPC3 are satisfied.
THEOREM 3.33. PPCc3 with the defined weak equality satisfies the
axioms of PPC3.
Vice versa, if we start with the original PPC3 and we define
a ≡ b def⇐⇒ a = b and 1a = 1b
we can prove that the axioms of PPCc3 are satisfied, provided that we give
the following definition for the extra symbols.
+ := 0 a := 0
1+ := 0 1a := a
Note that in these definitions we must specify not only the value of the
defined term but also that of its presupposition, owing to the noncompos-
itionality of the system. Since these definitions extend the domain of the
operator 1, we must check that the axioms pertaining to it are still satisfied.
THEOREM 3.34. PPC3 with the defined strong equality satisfies the
axioms of PPCc3.
But these embedding theorems are still too weak. Suppose we start out
with the system PPCc3 with the strong equality ≡. We now define the weak
equality = as
a = b def⇐⇒ a + 0 ≡ b + 0.
We know that this equality satisfies the axioms of PPC3. From this equality
we now define a new strong equality by
a ≡′ b def⇐⇒ a = b and 1a = 1b
We now want to prove that this strong equality coincides with the original
one.
LEMMA 3.35. 1a + 0 ≡ 1a
Proof Easy.
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THEOREM 3.36. a ≡ b if and only if a ≡′ b.
Proof From left to right, a ≡ b→ a ≡′ b, is immediate by substitution.
From right to left, a ≡′ b → a ≡ b, needs some reasoning. Assume
that a ≡′ b holds. If we unfold the definition of≡′ we obtain that a = b and
1a = 1b. If we unfold also the definition of = we obtain that a+0 ≡ b+0
and 1a + 0 ≡ 1b + 0. From these equalities we want to derive that a ≡ b.
From the first equality and axiom Ac11 we have that 1a ≡ 1b . From the
second equality and lemma 3.35 we have that 1a ≡ 1b. Now by axiom Ac12
we have that
a ≡ ˜1a · 1a ≡ ˜1b · 1b ≡ b
as desired.
An interesting property is the following.
LEMMA 3.37. a˜ + b ≡ a˜ · b + a · b˜.
Proof The proof is given in the original system PPC3, i.e., we prove that
a˜ + b = a˜ · b + a · b˜ and 1˜
a+b = 1a˜·b+a·˜b.
a˜ + b e17= a˜ · b˜ + a˜ · b̂ + â · b˜ = a˜ · b + a · b˜
1˜
a+b
D2= 1a+b C2= 1a + 1b.
1a˜·b+a ·˜b
C1,C2= 1a˜ · 1b + 1a · 1b˜ def= 1a˜ · 1b̂+b˜ + 1â+b˜ · 1b˜
C2= 1a˜ · (1b̂ + 1b˜)+ (1â + 1a˜) · 1b˜ D3= 1a˜ · (1+ 1b˜)+ (1 + 1a˜) · 1b˜
= 1a˜ · 1 + 1 · 1b˜ = 1a˜ + 1b˜
D2= 1a + 1b
Therefore 1˜
a+b = 1a˜·b+a ·˜b and the second part of the lemma is proved.
3.7. Models of PPCc3
DEFINITION 3.38. A PPCc3-model is a pair 〈B, δ〉, where B is a Boolean
algebra B = 〈B; #,unionsq,⊥,&,−〉 and δ is an assignment that maps every
variable in the language to an element of the set
M := {〈p, q〉 ∈ B2 | q ( p}
where( indicates the order on B : q ( p means q#p = q or, equivalently,
q unionsq p = p.
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Given a model we define the interpretation of every term of PPCc3 by
an element of M
[[−]]δ : T −→ M
by induction on the structure of the term (the functions π1 and π2 are the
first and second projection, respectively: π1〈p, q〉 = p and π2〈p, q〉 = q):
[[a]]δ := δ(α) for every literal α
[[+]]δ := 〈⊥,⊥〉
[[1]]δ := 〈&,&〉
[[˜a]]δ := 〈π1[[a]]δ, π1[[a]]δ # π2[[a]]δ〉
[[1a]]δ := 〈&, π1[[a]]δ〉
[[a]]δ := 〈π2[[a]]δ,⊥〉
[[a + b]]δ := 〈π1[[a]]δ unionsq π1[[b]]δ, π2[[a]]δ unionsq π2[[b]]δ〉
[[a · b]]δ := 〈π1[[a]]δ # π1[[b]]δ, π2[[a]]δ # π2[[b]]δ〉
The elementary relation ≡ is interpreted as identity of the interpreta-
tions of the terms.
DEFINITION 3.39. a ≡ b is valid in the PPCc3-model 〈B, δ〉 if [[a]]δ =[[b]]δ .
THEOREM 3.40. [Validity Theorem] If a ≡ b is provable in PPCc3 then[[a]]δ = [[b]]δ for every PPC3-model 〈B, δ〉.
Proof By induction on the length of the proof of a ≡ b. It is enough to
prove the validity of all the axioms.
By the definition of the interpretation it follows that the defined symbols
are interpreted in the following way:
[[0]]δ = 〈&,⊥〉
[[̂a]]δ = 〈&, π1[[a]]δ〉
[[a]]δ = 〈&, π2[[a]]δ〉
3.8. Equivalence with PPC3-models
If we have a PPCc3-model (i.e., one of the models of Definition 3.38) we
can obtain a PPC3-model (i.e., a model in the sense of Definition 3.9) by
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Vice versa given a PPC3-model 〈B, ρ, ξ 〉 we obtain a PPCc3-model by
taking the same Boolean algebra B and defining the map δ as
δ(α) := 〈ξ(α), ρ(α)〉.
3.9. Completeness of PPCc3
We prove now completeness of PPCc3 with respect to the defined mod-
els, deriving it from the completeness of PPC3 and the correspondence
between the models of the two systems outlined in Subsection 3.8.
THEOREM 3.41. Let a and b be two propositions. If for every PPCc3-
model 〈B, δ〉, [[a]]δ = [[b]]δ, then a ≡ b is derivable in PPCc3.
Proof Suppose the interpretations of a and b coincide in every model. We
construct a term model by taking the Boolean algebra B := (T / =)
of terms of Definition 3.14 and defining the assignment δ as δ(α) :=
〈ξ(α), ρ(α)〉 = 〈[1α], [α]〉 for every atomic proposition α. By Lemma
3.15 and Subsection 3.8, 〈B, δ〉 is a model of PPCc3. Hence [[a]]δ = [[b]]δ
by hypothesis. We prove a preparatory lemma.
LEMMA 3.42. For every proposition a, [[a]]δ = 〈[[1a]]ρξ , [[a]]ρξ 〉.
Proof By induction on the structure of a.
Using the lemma we have that
〈[[1a]]ρξ , [[a]]ρξ 〉 = 〈[[1b]]ρξ , [[b]]ρξ 〉.
The two components must be equal, [[1a]]ρξ = [[1b]]ρξ and [[a]]ρξ = [[b]]ρξ .
By lemma 3.15 we have then that 1a = 1b and a = b, that is, a ≡ b by
Theorem 3.36.
4. FURTHER PERSPECTIVES: MODAL LOGIC
The concept of noncompositional operator can be put to further use, e.g., in
the logic of the modalities POSSIBLE (Poss) and NECESSARY (Nec). Nat-
ural language modalities differ from metaphysical modalities in that they
are valuated relative to a given context or knowledge state, representable
as a given sentence AG. Poss(B) means that B is consistent with AG, and
Nec(B) means that B is entailed by AG.
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More formally, for every given sentence AG there is a set of new
sentences PAG , the sentences that are possible relative to AG, defined as
PAG := {B: /AG/ ∩ /B/ 
= ∅}. If B ∈ PAG , then Poss(B) is true relative
to AG.
For every given sentence AG there is also a set of new sentences
NAG , the sentences that are necessary relative to AG, defined as NAG :=
{B: /AG/ ⊆ /B/}. If B ∈ NAG , then Nec(B) is true relative to AG.
What are /Poss(B)/ and /Nec(B)/? Note that Poss(B) and Nec(B) are
not sentences in the ordinary sense (where the interpretation of a sentence
is the set of situations in which it is the case). The sentences Poss(B) and
Nec(B) are just true or false and have no direct interpretation as a -space.
A key of propositions is required, i.e., a PARAKEY. (A METAKEY is a key
of linguistic elements, not propositions.) The elements of the PARAKEY
(PK) are discourse domains, i.e., propositions. The relation between modal
propositions (e.g., Poss(B)) and discourse domains (e.g., AG in the previ-
ous case) parallels the one between ordinary propositions and states in the
world. As we define the extension of an ordinary proposition A as the set
of situations s that make A true, we can define the extension of a modal
proposition as the set of discourse domains that make it true.
Hence the extension of Poss(B) is the set of all those discourse domains
(propositions) A such that A makes Poss(B) true, that is, the set of those
A such that B is possible relative to A:
/Poss(B)/ = {A | A makes Poss(B) true}
= {A | B is consistent with A}
= {A | B ∈ PA}
= {A | /A/ ∩ /B/ 
= ∅}
as depicted in Figure 16, where we call PPK the universe containing the







Figure 16. Set-theoretic interpretation of the modality of possibility.
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Similarly the extension of Nec(B) is the set of all those discourse do-
mains (propositions) A such that A makes Nec(B) true, that is, the set of
those A such that B is necessary relative to A:
/Nec(B)/ = {A | A makes Nec(B) true}
= {A | A entails B}
= {A | B ∈ NA}
= {A | /A/ ⊆ /B/}








Figure 17. Set-theoretic interpretation of the modality of necessity.
Our arguments on presuppositions hold also at this second level,
once we specify what the presuppositions of modal sentences are. Every
proposition Poss(B) or Nec(B) presupposes that B is well-formed, well-
anchored and well-keyed (i.e., has a TV). This happens when the presup-
positions of B are fulfilled. Therefore the presupposition of Poss(B) (or of
Nec(B)) is satisfied whenever 1B is true. However, we must be careful not
to confuse the two levels: the extension of 1B is a subset of K, whereas we
expect the extension of 1Poss(B) to be a subset of PK. In other words the
presupposition of Poss(B) cannot be 1B , because the latter is an element
of PK, whereas 1Poss(B) needs to be an element of PPK. 1Poss(B) should be
a para-proposition whose extension consists of all the discourse domains
in which B is well-keyed and well-anchored, i.e., all the discourse domains
that entail 1B . In conclusion we expect that
/1Poss(B)/ = {A | A entails 1B} = /Nec(1B)/
The natural definition is thus 1Poss(B) := Nec(1B). Similarly 1Nec(B) :=
Nec(1B).
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This is not yet correct: the given definitions do not satisfy in general the
property that for every proposition B, the extension of B is contained in the
extension of its presupposition, /B/ ⊆ /1B/ (Figure 18 left). The property
holds for the necessity operator, /Nec(B)/ ⊆ /1Nec(B)/ = /Nec(1B)/, for
every proposition B; but it fails for the possibility operator, as it is not
in general true that /Poss(B)/ = {A | /A/ ∩ /B/ 
= ∅} is contained in
/1Poss(B)/ = /Nec(1B)/ = {A | /A/ ⊆ /1B/} (Figure 18 right).








A ∈ /Nec(B)/⇒ A ∈ /Nec(1B)/ A ∈ /Poss(B)/ but A 
∈ /Nec(1B)/
Figure 18. Extension of the presuppositions of modal sentences.
We must therefore change the definition of /Poss(B)/. The correct
definition is
/Poss(B)/ = {A | /A/ ⊆ /1B/ and /A/ ∩ /B/ 
= ∅}.
Then it is the case that /A/ ⊆ /1A/ holds in general. For example, for
A = Poss(B) we find that /1Poss(B)/ = /Nec(1B)/ = {A | /A/ ⊆ /1B/},
which is clearly a superset of /Poss(B)/, according to the definition of
/Poss(B)/ that we have just given.
From these definitions the usual modal theorems Nec(∼B) =
∼(Poss(B)) and Poss(∼B) = ∼(Nec(B)) follow:
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/Nec(∼B)/ = {A | /A/ ⊆ /∼B/}
= {A | /A/ ⊆ /1B/− /B/}
/∼(Poss(B))/ = /1Poss(B)/− /Poss(B)/
= /Nec(1B)/− /Poss(B)/
= {A | /A/ ⊆ /1B/}
−{A | /A/ ⊆ /1B/ and /A/ ∩ /B/ 
= ∅}
= {A | /A/ ⊆ /1B/ and /A/ ∩ /B/ = ∅}
= {A | /A/ ⊆ /1B/− /B/}
/Poss(∼B)/ = {A | /A/ ⊆ /1∼B/ and /A/ ∩ /∼B/ 
= ∅}
= {A | /A/ ⊆ /1B/ and /A/ ∩ (/1B/− /B/) 
= ∅}
= {A | /A/ ⊆ /1B/ and /A/− /B/ 
= ∅}
/∼(Nec(B))/ = /1Nec(B)/− /Nec(B)/
= /Nec(1B)/− /Nec(B)/
= {A | /A/ ⊆ /1B/} − {A | /A/ ⊆ /B/}
= {A | /A/ ⊆ /1B/ and /A/  /B/}
= {A | /A/ ⊆ /1B/ and /A/− /B/ 
= ∅}
Note that the modal theorems do not hold for the other negations:
/Nec(B)/ = {A | /A/ ⊆ /1B/}
/Poss(B)/ = {A | /A/ 
⊆ /1B/}
So, in general /Nec(B)/ 
= /Poss(B)/. Similarly for the Boolean
negation.
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